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The purpose of this paper is to review what has been learnt from the growing volume 
of applied research on child labor and to indicate directions for future research. We start by 
looking at research by the World Bank, which has played a fairly pioneering role in this area 
in data collection and, increasingly, in data analysis, more recently in cooperation with other 
agencies, such as the ILO and UNICEF. With a view to guiding policy interventions in this 
area, we attempt to identify the patterns  which arise from the study of a wide range of 
countries. We emphasize that the current state of empirical research makes this task difficult: 
A striking feature of available research is the sheer variety of results that it has produced. 
This review discusses the extent to which this diversity is a result of methodological 
problems, as opposed to genuine country variations. We argue that the neglect of statistical 
issues such as endogeneity, measurement error and aggregation error has biased the results of 
a number of studies. At least as important a shortcoming is that empirical research has been 
conducted without adequate reference to theory. As a result, the estimated equations are 
sometimes mis-specified and often difficult to interpret. This impedes the confidence with 
which policy prescriptions can be applied. 
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This paper reviews research on child labor, concentrating on research conducted in or 
commissioned mainly by the World Bank
1. Child labor is not just a contemporary 
phenomenon and, for economic historians, sociologists and anthropologists, it is not a new 
subject. For economists, it is. A lively interest in the economics of child labor is only about 
five years old, although this literature has been growing exponentially. Much of the empirical 
work in this field has relied upon multi-topic or integrated household surveys such as the 
Living Standards Measurement Surveys conducted by the World Bank in association with the 
governments of about forty developing countries (see www.worldbank.org/lsms for a full 
list). As a result, a lot of the early work in this area has been conducted at or for the World 
Bank. A striking feature of this literature is the range of estimates obtained for the effects of 
common explanatory variables such as household income or household size. The motivation 
for writing this paper is to assess whether any clear patterns can be discerned from the corpus 
of results for different countries. The further step of marshaling the evidence to inform 
policies directed at reducing the incidence and severity of child labor requires an 
understanding of behavior, of markets and institutions and of the local political economy. 
Given the potential complexity of the problem, it is imperative to have a theoretical model 
from the structure of which testable predictions can be derived and taken to the data to be 
rejected or not. We argue in this paper that empirical studies of child labor have paid too little 
                                                                 
*The authors: Sonia Bhalotra, Departm ent of Economics, University of Bristol, Email: 
s.bhalotra@bristol.ac.uk,.  Zafiris Tzannatos, Adviser The World Bank Group, . Email: 
ptzannatos@worldbank.org. 
1 The review is not comprehensive. There are certainly some studies that have not been incorporated in this 
review, especially more recent ones. There is also a rapidly growing literature outside the Bank, to which only 
passing reference is made.  
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attention to theoretical developments in the field. There is considerable scope for bridging 
this gap. 
  An early review paper by Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) set out the issues and 
surveyed very early work, the new generation of research on child labor having appeared 
after their paper.
2 Grootaert and Patrinos (1998) survey the findings of comparable research 
studies on Cote d’Ivoire, Colombia, Bolivia and the Philippines. Sasaki (1999) surveys a 
larger set of fifteen or so papers on child labor and education. A review of research on child 
labor in three African countries (Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Zambia) is presented in 
Canagarajah and Nielsen (2000). Andvig (1999) surveys the economic and anthropological 
literature concerned with family-controlled child labor in Africa. Further discussion of 
research questions and research findings relating to child labor in Africa is in Bhalotra 
(2002). Some empirical work is reviewed in Basu (1999), who is primarily concerned with 
concepts, theory and policy, and less with assessing the evidence. A broad non-technical 
overview of the economics of child labor and policy alternatives is presented in Grimsrud 
(1999), who also suggests a niche for World Bank activities in this area.  A more recent 
survey was undertaken by Basu and Tzannatos (2003) which summarized definitional issues, 
theoretical considerations, empirical research and policy implications. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by raising the question 
of why we care about child labor and then describing briefly the survey data used in most of 
the studies discussed in this paper.  
Section 3 describes patterns that emerge from a perusal of descriptive data. These 
patterns are not necessarily reflected in multivariate analyses of the data, conditional 
correlations often being different from unconditional correlations. Also, the nature of 
conditional correlations depends upon model structure.  
Section 4 presents an analytical framework for thinking about child labor. This serves 
two purposes. First, it offers some principles around which the ensuing discussion of a list of 
explanatory variables can be organized. Second, it makes the point that policy choices can 
and should be linked to an analysis of the causes of child labor.  
                                                                 
2 This paper differs not only in its scope but also in its style. We not only review empirical findings but also 
assess these findings in terms of their statistical robustness and their coherence with theory.  
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Section 5 is dedicated to a detailed consideration of the relation between child labor 
and poverty - Since this relationship is central to much research and policy discussion..  
An overview of statistical and other methodological issues that arise in analyzing 
child labor is presented in Section 6.  
This is followed by a summary of the results of the surveyed studies in Section 7.  
Finally, Section 8 comments on drawing policy implications from the available 
microeconometric research. 
2. MOTIVATION AND DATABASE 
2.1. Grounds for Concern 
Although the average man or woman on the street would probably agree that child 
labor should be reduced/eliminated, not all social scientists would agree. A body of academic 
opinion associates policy interventions with a cramping of the freedom to choose and argues 
that child labor encourages socialization, independence and self-esteem in childhood.  Most 
economists, on the other hand, would be likely to see sensibly designed interventions as 
expanding the choice set facing families. For example, building more schools, reducing fees 
or offering credit to families to help them smooth over income fluctuations are all potentially 
beneficial policies that do not involve constraining individual behavior.  
  Amongst reasons that we care about child labor is that it has potential ill-effects on 
the health, education, moral well-being and social development of the child, with 
implications that persist over the child’s lifecycle (some evidence  on these effects is 
considered later on in this paper).
3 Many of these effects tend to perpetuate across 
generations, reducing economic and social mobility. For example, the evidence surveyed in 
this paper shows that parental education has a positive effect on child school attendance and  
                                                                 
3  Child labor also generates experience-capital which, in certain circumstances, may be more valuable than the 
educational capital available from an alternative allocation of time. These are typically circumstances in which 
there is limited job mobility (so that a child is likely to work with a parent in a certain occupation, like farming, 
and then grow up to continue in this occupation) and the quality of available education is poor (as a result of 
which the value of educational capital is low). A long run policy that aims to improve the conditions under 
which the poor live will tend to address these problems so that, in the long run, one may assume that the returns 
to education exceed any positive returns to experience that child labor generates.  
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a negative effect on the probability and extent of child labor. So less educated parents tend to 
send their children to work and these children grow up to be less educated parents, who then 
send their children to work – thus perpetuating poverty (a phenomenon called dynastic trap 
by Basu and Tzannatos, 2003). Since cause and effect are reinforcing, resulting in persistence 
of poverty from one generation to another, this situation calls for government intervention to 
break  this vicious circle. We argue that there is unambiguous merit in the objective of 
equalising opportunities for children, releasing the future prospects of children from the 
clutch of their family background.  
  On top of these individual level (microeconomic) effects there are also important 
macroeconomic effects of child labor. With theoretical developments in the area of 
endogenous growth, economists have produced considerable evidence, in recent years, of 
externalities associated with human capital accumulation that imply that the social return to 
human capital investment exceeds the private return ( see, for example,  Ray, 1998). So 
improving the human capital base of the economy is good not just for individual children but 
for the economy as a whole. Macroeconomic data show that countries that spend a greater 
fraction of GDP on education have higher growth rates, other things being equal (see 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992, for example). This offers an  a priori justification for 
government intervention. Moreover, in developing countries, educational expansion can 
contribute to democratic change and to achieving lower fertility.  
  In addition to having instrumental value, education, health and freedom have intrinsic 
value. Some, though not all, forms of child l abor are clearly an imposition on the child, 
whether by poverty or by the avariciousness of an adult or the neglect of society. To the 
extent that the child is inherently vulnerable and not in a position to exercise choice, child 
labor commands attention. 
2.2. Multi-Topic Household Surveys 
Up until a decade ago, most research on child labor referred to case studies in which 
small samples of working children were interviewed or observed (Bequele and Boyden 
(1988), Bhatty (1998) and Addison et al (1997)). While these studies offer important insights 
into the wages and working conditions of working children, they are often unable to 
illuminate the fundamental question of why children work because they contain no  
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information on the counterfactual. Historical studies of child labor (Cunningham (1996), 
Horrell and Humphries (1995), Moehling (1999), Humphries (2003)) make ingenious use of 
data but are typically restricted to data that are thin either in observations or in the range of 
control variables available.  
New analytical insights were developed using the Living Standards Measurement 
Surveys (LSMS). These are integrated household surveys that began in the 1980s and, at the 
time of writing, about 40 surveys have been completed.
4  The LSMS gather information for 
all individuals, whether working or not. The data include socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics at the individual, household and community levels. Information on 
educational enrollment and attainment is available for each person in the sampled household.  
Data on employment, hours and wages are typically available for all persons in the household 
over the age of 7 or 10, depending upon the country in question. The data on the employment 
and education status of children can easily be linked to information on the economic 
resources, educational levels and demographic composition of their households, as well as to 
a range of price and infrastructure variables pertaining to the communities in which they live. 
For these reasons, the LSMS are fairly well suited to analysis of child labor. However, a 
weakness of these data is that most are single cross-sections, though panel data are available 
for some countries, including Cote d’Ivoire, Peru and Ghana
5. Panel data not only allow the 
researcher to model dynamics but they also produce more robust estimates of marginal 
effects by virtue of offering methods for controlling for individual (or household) level 
unobservables.  There is fortunately, now a small literature that analyzes the dynamics of 
child labor.
6 
In line with the production of LSMS data, international organizations and country 
governments have also been conducting relevant household or labor force surveys. For 
example, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has produced excellent 
household survey data for a number of developing countries, including panel data for 
Ethiopia, the Philippines and Pakistan (see  www.cgiar.org).  Similarly, the RAND 
                                                                 
4 Grosh and Glewwe (1995) present an excellent overview of the LSMS database. 
5 A panel is a linked stack of cross-sectional data. In other words, panel data contain time-series information on 
individuals (or households or other cross-sectional units). 
6 Basu (1999), Dessy (2000), Razzaz (2001), Hazan and Berdugo (2002), Emerson and Souza (2002), Bell and 
Gersbach (2001).  
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Corporation has a string of Family Life Surveys for Indonesia, Malaysia and other 
developing countries (see www.rand.org). The International Labour Office (ILO) has a 
number of surveys (SIMPOC) specifically designed to acquire information on child activities 
though these are not full-scale multi-topic surveys. Similarly, UNICEF has its own data 
(MICS).
7  Information on these has been assimilated with related information on the 
Understanding Child Work (UCW) Program website at UNICEF (Florence) (see 
http://www.ucw-project.org/), marking a pioneering joint i nitiative on the part of the 
UNICEF, ILO and World Bank to bring together their resources on child labor.
8 
It is worth pointing out that the literature reviewed in this paper misses out on street 
children, refugee populations, orphans and institutionalized children. While they often 
constitute a small fraction of working children, these groups are likely to be engaged in the 
most detrimental forms of child labor.
9 
3. A PICTURE OF CHILD LABOR 
Although the features of the data differ by continent, country, rural/urban sector, 
gender and type of child work, some interesting stylized facts emerge.
10 These facts can 
guide research and policy-making in two ways. First, in selecting interesting and relevant 
research questions. Second, in identifying regions or populations to target. For example, the 
preponderance of self-employment in the rural regions of most developing countries 
immediately implies a limited relevance of legislation enforcing adult minimum wages
11. 
Similarly, the significance of the recent debate over trade sanctions (Golub (1997), Fields 
(1995), Basu (1999), (Bhalotra (1999)) is diminished once it is recognized that only a very 
                                                                 
7 SIMPOC is the ILO's Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour. It carries out a 
wide range of child labor specific surveys around the world. Key to SIMPOC are national household-based 
surveys collecting detailed information on the extent, nature, causes and consequences of child labor. See: 
www.ilo.org/ipec/simpoc.  UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) are based on household 
surveys and provide a list of global indicators which were developed jointly with other agencies (for example, 
WHO, UNESCO and the ILO) to assess progress in the area of children.  For more info see 
http://childinfo.org/MICS2. 
8 For a summary of the project, see Fyfe, Roselaers, Tzannatos and Rosati (2003). 
9 The ILO has conducted rapid assessment surveys in a number of countries with a view to assessing the 
incidence and nature of child labor amongst children living outside households (see www.ilo.org/ipec). 
10 See also ILO, 2002. 
11 For a theoretical analysis of the impact of adult minimum wages on child labor, see Basu (2000).  
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small fraction of working children is engaged in the export-producing sectors of developing 
countries
12. 
1.  While population-dense Asia has the largest number of working children, the incidence 
of child labor is higher in sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the world.  
2.  Participation rates of children have been declining everywhere since the 1950s but, in the 
last two decades, parts of Africa have registered an increase (see Andvig, 1999). This is, 
likely, related to economic recession, conflict, wars and the AIDS epidemic all of which 
result in significant changes in (often, total destruction of) family structures. 
3.  The vast majority of working children in developing countries are engaged in agricultural 
work, typically on family-run farms. Indeed, often hardly any children work on the open 
labor market for a wage in Africa, where wage markets are incipient.  
4.  Consistent with this, the work participation rates of children tend to be higher in rural 
than in urban regions.  
5.  Child labor is not the inverse of school attendance.  
•  Many children combine work and school and this is especially common when the 
work they do is on family-run farms or enterprises. This is facilitated by school 
schedules that accommodate agricultural seasons. It seems more common to 
combine work and school in Africa and Latin America than in Asia.  
•  Household surveys for several developing countries find that a substantial fraction 
of children are neither in work nor in school. This fraction is typically larger for 
girls than for boys, an indication that “doing nothing” may correspond to doing 
housework
13.  
•  The effects on education of engaging in work should be considered separately for 
attendance, grade progression and achievement (learning outcomes) since, even 
                                                                 
12 It is recognized that minimum wage laws or trade sanctions may have indirect effects on children working on 
family farms or enterprises who do not fall directly in the scope of these interventions. For example, an adult 
minimum wage may raise the overall demand for child labor. The point here is to emphasize that even the most 
well considered policy intervention will miss the mark unless it starts out with a fair knowledge of the nature 
and incidence of child labor. 
13 Rural India is a notable exception in this regard: see the data in Cigno and Rosati (2000).  
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when working children attend school, their educational attainment are likely to be 
lower than for full-time school-goers.
14  
6.  The history and geography of child labor reveal an negative but not linear relation of 
economic development and the incidence of child labor (in the sense that child labor falls 
relatively fast as low income countries grow but more or less stabilizes among middle 
income countries until a critical level of higher income is attained).
15   See also Section 
5.1. 
7.  At the microlevel, the relation of household income and child labor is often found to be 
non-linear and, in many cases, is weak, while ownership of productive assets (like land) 
can increase child labor.  
8.  Most countries exhibit large gender differentials in total child labor force participation. 
Even more often, the distribution of girls and boys across different types of child work is 
different.  
A rough generalization is that the proportions in work and out of school are larger for 
girls than for boys in Asia, the proportion in work but not necessarily the proportion out of 
school is larger for boys than for girls in Latin America, and the proportions of boys and girls 
in work and school are roughly similar in most parts of Africa, though there is significant 
gender segmentation in occupations. 
4. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1. Incentives, Constraints and Agency 
When discussing the determinants of child labor, the question that often arises is 
whether this is not a trivial pursuit: is it not evident that poverty is the cause of child labor? 
The answer is that it is not evident. The idea that poverty compels child labor reflects the 
importance of subsistence constraints. However, micro-data reveal that children work in 
households that cannot be classified as subsistence-poor. There must, therefore, be other 
reasons that children work.  
                                                                 
14 This is confirmed in a recent analysis of this issue with reference to Latin American countries.  For a 
summary see Orazem, Sedlacek and Tzannatos (2003). 
15 Fallon and Tzannatos (1997).  
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A useful organization of causes is to categorize them as incentives, constraints or 
agency (see Bhalotra, 2000b). Consider each in turn. The incentive to work is determined by 
the return to work relative to alternative uses of time such as school attendance. Thus 
children may work because the net returns to education are low and the returns to work 
experience are relatively large. Policy can modify incentives, for example, by improving 
school quality or lowering school fees.  
Even where incentives favor education over work, a household may be compelled by 
poverty constraints to send a child to work. When these are binding, the opportunity cost of 
schooling is too high. In this case, policy interventions are best targeted at alleviating poverty 
in households supplying child labor.  
As indicated above, most child workers are employed on household-run farms or 
enterprises, by their own families. Even if they work outside the home, decisions over child 
time allocation are often taken by adults. While these adults are typically parents, a 
substantial and growing fraction of children in Africa are in the care of adults who are not 
their parents- this is because of both fostering and orphanhood. There are therefore agency 
issues relating to child labor that distinguish it from adult labor. However remote it may seem 
at first glance there is, in principle, the possibility that adults are not quite as altruistic as we 
tend to assume. In this case, child welfare may be raised by policies that make schooling 
compulsory or that ban child labor, thereby eliminating adult agency. 
These three different factors may, of course, interact. For example, adult labor supply 
decisions will determine the tightness of the household budget constraint. So adults with 
limited altruism may choose to consume some leisure while sending children to work. If 
poverty is measured by adult income then what appears to be a poverty constraint might in 
fact be relaxed under greater parent altruism. 
In any real context, the different causal factors will prevail to different extents and 
they may interact with one another. However, since the policy implications are very different, 
depending upon whether it is incentives, constraints or agency factors that dominate, it is 
important to investigate their relative force. As of now, there is a considerable distance 
between theory and applied research in this area. Section 5 describes some empirical work 
that attempts to discriminate between the alternative hypotheses.   
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4.2. Markets and Institutions 
The strength of markets and institutions will mediate the force of incentives, 
constraints and agency. In this Section, we consider the role of imperfections in the markets 
for credit, land and labor, and the part played by tastes and norms. For example, 
underdeveloped credit markets will tend to increase the impact of constraints in determining 
child labor (see Ranjan (1999), Lahiri and Jaffrey (1999) and also Baland and Robinson 
(2000)). Limited access to capital markets not only perpetuates chronic poverty but also traps 
non-poor households in states of poverty following income shocks (Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger and (1993), Morduch (1994)). Poor households are likely to be particularly risk-
averse and they may employ children ex ante to diversify their sources of income (Anker and 
Melkas, 1995) or ex post to make up income losses in bad times (also see Section 7.18 for 
evidence).  
Similarly, imperfect labor markets may strengthen the incentive to put children to 
work. For example, it may be difficult to substitute hired labor for family labor, or difficult to 
rent out or sell land. This creates an incentive to employ family labor (Cockburn (2000), 
Bhalotra and Heady (2000)). The fact that the marginal product of family labor is increasing 
in the value of productive assets such as land or livestock means that we may expect to find 
that the children of the land-rich (for example) are more likely to be in work than are the 
children of small landowners or landless agricultural workers. Remarkably, this is the case in 
rural Ghana and Pakistan (Bhalotra and Heady, 2000) and, likely, in other countries too.  
Anthropologists have suggested that children may work because they enjoy work or 
the independence that it brings more than they enjoy going to school (Delap, 1999). Thus 
incentives can be non-material and local policy interventions should be sensitive to 
encouraging  creativity a nd joy in education as much as to improving infrastructure and 
increasing pecuniary returns. The question of parent’s agency and altruism towards children 
is clearly likely to be influenced by social norms. In some societies and at certain stages of 
industrialization, child labor may be more acceptable than in other times and places 
(Adelman and Robinson, 1989).
16  
                                                                 
16 For a general discussion of norms that incorporates the anthropological literature, see Andvig (1999). For a 
model of social stigma that exhibits multiple equilibria, see Lopez-Calva (2003).   
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4.3. Supply and Demand 
We have so far spoken largely of how incentives, constraints and agency, working 
through markets and institutions, influence the decision (of parents) to supply child labor. 
What about the demand side of the market? Together with total supply, demand determines 
relative wages and hence the incentive to supply labor. If child labor is in fact substitutable 
(be it imperfectly) for (unskilled) adult labor in production, then cost-minimizing employers 
will only prefer children if they are effectively cheaper. In principle, a well-functioning labor 
market should equalize effective wages, that is, wages adjusted for productivity. Under these 
conditions, employers are indifferent between adults and children and, with improvement in 
adult skills and, thereby, the relative productivity of adults, households will face a falling 
nominal return to child labor. In practice, however, just as women continue to be paid less 
than men for equal work, children may be paid disproportionately less than adults There is 
some evidence that this is the case (Grimsrud, 1999). This sort of wage discrimination, by 
making child labor more cost-effective, raises the demand for it. 
Historical analyses and case studies have, moreover, identified non-pecuniary reasons 
why employers prefer to hire children. A possible argument consistent with the casting of 
employers of child labor as exploitative is that children are relatively easy to control (this is a 
similar argument to the one for the “docility” of female workers).  
Other arguments relate to the technology of particular sectors. For instance, children 
worked in coal mines in England because they were just small enough to go down the shafts. 
There was a visible decline in child labor with advances in the technology of mining (for 
example, Kirby, 2000). The concentration of children in the production of matchsticks, 
fireworks, footballs and carpet weaving in contemporary South Asia has similarly been 
thought to be related to their having small and nimble fingers (although see Levison et al 
(1996) and Anker and Barge (1998) discredit this view). Technical change may thus change 
the demand for child relative to adult labor by altering their relative marginal productivities. 
For example, Levy (1985) finds that mechanization in Egyptian agriculture reduced the 
incidence of child labor. Technical change will also tend to increase the return to schooling 
for given levels of school access and school quality (see Rosenzweig (1995), Foster and 
Rosenzweig (2000)). The  total demand for labor (adult and child) is also a function of  
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technological change, though whether total demand increases or decreases depends upon the 
relative strength of efficiency and substitution effects.  
The studies we survey have typically used household-level data and concentrated on 
the supply side, that is on the characteristics of households that send children into work or 
upon the characteristics of children themselves. Many do not control for demand effects - 
which may be done by including region fixed effects or a regional unemployment rate (see 
Sections 7.15, 7.16).  
5. POVERTY AND CHILD LABOR 
From a policy perspective, it is interesting to consider how child labor responds to 
trends in economic growth (and globalization). A fair consideration of these issues lies 
outside the scope of this paper, which is primarily concerned with what a selection of 
empirical research on microdata has found. However, as there is some evidence on the effects 
of growth and trade-expansion on poverty and poverty levels will reflect changes associated 
with growth and trade reform (for instance, in consumer and producer prices), a first step in 
linking the available microeconometric evidence with the larger questions of growth and 
globalization is to study the relation of poverty and child labor.  
5.1. Aggregate vs. Microdata 
The reason that poverty is perceived as the explanation for child labor is probably that 
both the geographic distribution of child workers today and the economic history of specific 
regions demonstrate a negative association of child work and aggregate income (for example, 
see the data in ILO, 1996a). These aggregate associations are often evoked as evidence of 
poverty effects, as for example, in Grimsrud (1999). These data show that the labor force 
participation rate of children aged 10-14 is decreasing in per capita GDP: it is 30-60% in 
countries with a per capita GDP of $500 or less (at 1987 prices) and it falls to 10-30% in 
countries with incomes between $500-$1000. Balancing this picture, Andvig (1999, p.3) 
points out that the relation of national income and child labor participation (using ILO 
statistics) is weak in a sample of African countries. This is consistent with the fact that 
virtually all child labor in sub-Saharan Africa is family-controlled and that labor markets are 
relatively underdeveloped in this region.  
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The problem with aggregative evidence is that it is unclear whether it was the rise in 
household incomes that eliminated child labor by dispelling the need for it, or whether the 
instrumental factors were the introduction of relevant legislation or other structural changes 
such as in returns to education, school availability and technology. This is because aggregate 
income may register an increase without any increase in the incomes of households 
supplying child labor. At the same time, economic growth or increases in aggregate income 
tend to be associated with the development of legal and political infrastructure, as well as 
with shifting and evolving social norms. In the last decade, microdata for developing 
countries have become available, which make it possible to disentangle household living 
standards (a microeconomic variable, which differs across households) from factors like new 
laws or changed norms, which apply equally across households (Bhalotra, 2000a). The 
resulting microeconometric research is reviewed in Section 7 below. 
What effect of household living standards does microeconomic theory lead us to 
expect? When the choice is between work and leisure, and leisure is a normal good, it 
predicts a negative effect of household income on child labor
17. When school attendance is 
admitted as a further possible use of child time, a negative effect is predicted as long as the 
marginal utility from attending school exceeds the marginal utility from working (Bhalotra 
and Heady (2000)). The case for a negative effect is weakened if parents can make transfers 
to their children by means other than investing in their human capital, for example, through 
capital markets. Investments in educating children will then be made up to the point where 
the return to education equals the return to capital market investments (Rosati and Tzannatos 
(2000)).  Overall, subject to these provisos, we expect child labor to be decreasing in 
household income. 
5.2. Poverty Constraints 
A negative effect of income on hours of work is, however, expected for adults and for 
children and in poor as well as non-poor households. In other words, it only indicates that 
child leisure (or child schooling) is a normal good. How might we investigate the sharper 
                                                                 
17 “Household income” should be read as “the non-labor income of the child”. In an income-pooling or altruistic 
household, this is the labor income of adults in the household plus any asset income and, in an intertemporal 
setting, any borrowing.  
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question of whether poverty compels child labor? The basic theory of labor supply offers an 
answer. It tells us that if an individual is working under a binding income constraint or, 
equivalently, towards a target, then a drop in their wage rate will be matched by an increase 
in their labor supply, giving a wage elasticity of –1. More generally, if the household is very 
poor, the income effect will tend to dominate the substitution effect
18 and the wage elasticity 
will be negative (see Bhalotra, 2000a). Thus a testable prediction of the hypothesis of 
compelling poverty is that the wage elasticity is negative. A positive wage elasticity, on the 
other hand, is consistent with the view that children work on account of the relative returns to 
school being low. This test has the advantage that it does not require any arbitrary 
assumptions about poverty lines. Instead, it relies upon observable behavior (the reaction of 
work hours to wage changes) to indicate how compelling poverty is.  
Can this method be applied to investigate the behavior of children for whom wage 
data are not available, for example because they work on a family farm? As discussed in 
Section 3, this is the case for the vast majority of children. One alternative is to estimate 
shadow wages by estimating a farm production function (Jacoby (1993) does this for Peru 
though only for adult workers). Another might be to exploit variation in farm prices as these 
will alter the real wage (for a related study using data from the Cote d’Ivoire, see Alessie et 
al, 1992).  
The impact of credit constraints on school attendance and progression can be 
investigated by examining the significance of household income in a model of schooling. In 
the absence of credit constraints, schooling should be independent of income, and also of 
income shocks (see Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997). Recent research finds that credit constraints 
result in a larger reliance on child labor amongst families experiencing  income shocks 
(Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti (2003); see also Section 7.18). 
5.3. Parent Agency & Altruism 
The preceding discussion assumes that parents are altruistic and that men, women and 
children pool their incomes. This is the common assumption in the economics literature and 
it is often a critical assumption - whether in models of child labor (for example, Basu and 
                                                                 
18 The substitution effect is the effect of a wage change on the hours of work supplied, holding constant total 
income. It is always positive. Thus, if the wage goes up, hours supplied go up at constant income.   
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Van 1998) or macroeconomic policy (Barro, 1974). Basu and Van (1998) defend a strong 
assumption of parent altruism by arguing that the children of the non-poor do not work. 
However, microdata such as the LSMS show, for a number of developing countries, that the 
prevalence of child work in households with incomes above the subsistence level is not 
insubstantial. The empirical research reviewed in Section 7.2 confirms that income effects on 
child labor are surprisingly small even after controlling for correlated variables and 
endogeneity. Small effects of parental income on child labor are consistent with limited 
parental altruism. For this reason, investigation of altruism is relevant.  
How might this be done? Parent altruism corresponds to parental concern for child 
welfare (consumption, leisure, schooling).
19 A testable implication of the restriction that the 
relative weight on a child good in the parental utility function is non-zero is that marginal 
changes in adult consumption are positively associated with changes in child consumption, 
prices held constant.  The greater the increase in child consumption for a given increase in 
adult consumption, the greater is the degree of altruism. Equivalently, the degree of altruism 
is increasing in the ratio of the income effects on child consumption and adult consumption 
(see Bhalotra, 2001). 
Of course small income effects may be consistent with a high degree of parent 
altruism. For example, they may arise spuriously for reasons of statistical specification (see 
Section 6), or else they may be small because they are confounded with substitution effects 
associated with productive assets (Section 5.4). 
5.4. Market Imperfections 
Productive assets like land or enterprise-capital will have negative wealth effects on 
child labor and, in a perfect-markets economy, we would expect the children of large 
landowners to be less likely to be in work than the children of small landowners or landless 
agricultural workers. Remarkably, we observe the reverse tendency – for both boys and girls 
- and for countries as diverse as Ghana and Pakistan (see Table 1).  These facts challenge the 
common presumption that child labor emerges from the poorest households (as stated, for 
example, in U.S. Department of Labor (2000)). This is very important since the vast majority 
                                                                 
19 See, for example, Becker (1991).  
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of child workers in developing countries work on farms - typically family farms - in rural 
areas, and land is the most important store of wealth for rural households.  
The seeming paradox may, however, be explained by imperfections in labor and land 
markets - though credit market failure will tend to weaken the force of this paradox (Bhalotra 
and Heady 2000, Cockburn 2000). Consider credit market imperfection first. Since land is an 
important form of collateral, the effective interest rate will be a negative function of land 
ownership. So large landowners will find it easier to borrow and this will tend to reinforce 
the wealth effect. Labor market imperfections may make it difficult for landowners to hire in 
workers, whether on account of peak season labor shortages or on account of moral hazard 
(family labor is easier to supervise). If, at the same time, it is difficult to lease out land on 
account of land market imperfections then landowners have an incentive to employ family 
members, including children, on the farm. Since the marginal product of (family) labor is 
increasing in land size, this incentive is stronger the larger is the farm. There is also a 
reinforcing dynamic effect on marginal productivity that depends on the relative 
effectiveness of work experience and education in raising the future earnings of the child 
(also see Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985). This, in turn, depends upon the probability that the 
child will grow up to inherit the farm and upon any gender or birth-order biases in 
inheritance norms. If these effects overwhelm the wealth and collateral effects of land 
ownership then we may see the “wealth paradox”, that is, that child labor is increasing in 
household wealth, where wealth is measured in terms of productive assets. 
Including both a measure of total consumption and land size (or value of productive 
assets) allows separation of the wealth effect from the other (substitution) effects. A zero 
coefficient on land in an equation for child labor suggests no market imperfections or else 
counter-balancing imperfections. A non-zero coefficient signals market imperfections. A 
positive coefficient suggests that both the land and labor markets are imperfect and more so 
than the capital market. A negative coefficient suggests that the capital market is imperfect 
and more so than the land and labor markets (Bhalotra and Heady, 2000). Data permitting, it 
is useful to try to disentangle the labor and land market effects from the credit market effect 
(see Section 6.11). 
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6. ISSUES OF MODEL SPECIFICATION 
This Section discusses specification issues that arise in modeling child labor with a 
view to informing future research in this area. It also provides an analytical backdrop for the 
review of empirical research in Section 7. The review will reveal that estimates of effects of 
many determinants of child labor differ widely across studies. Does the diversity of results in 
the literature simply reflect the diversity of country experiences of child labor, or might it 
instead reflect a range of weaknesses in methodology? There is an interesting parallel here 
with research on female labor supply in OECD countries, which has produced a wide range 
of estimates of income and wage elasticities, often based upon the same data sources. The 
seeming inconsistency of these results has stimulated research into the microeconometrics of 
labor supply, where developments have been largely concerned with issues of sample 
selection, simultaneity or measurement error biases, and functional form (Mroz (1987), 
Heckman (1994)). Here we consider each of these issues in the context of the literature on 
child labor. We will also introduce other issues relevant to specifying a model of child labor. 
6.1. Censoring and Sample Selection  
Since only a small fraction of children work, modeling their labor supply raises issues 
of sample selection. In particular, both hours of work and wages are only available for 
individuals in work. The literature on child labor has side-stepped this problem by 
concentrating on estimation of reduced form participation equations. This involves throwing 
away information on hours of work which is typically available in the surveys used – and 
which reveals considerable variation, exploiting which can offer important insights (see 
Bhalotra 2000a). It also means that we have limited knowledge of how an important 
economic variable- the opportunity cost of working (the wage) - influences the amount of 
child work (see Section 7.3). In order to use the available data on hours and wages of 
children, sample-selection correction methods need to be employed (Heckman, 1974).
20 
While it has to be said that the Heckman estimator does not have a favorable record in terms 
of robustness, the literature on child labor can learn a lot by following developments in the 
                                                                 
20  Estimation of an hours model without the correction for endogenous selection into work participation will 
tend to create a positive bias on the wage coefficient.  
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literature on women’s labor supply (see Killingsworth and Heckman 1986 for an early 
assessment). 
Although the majority of studies estimate reduced form participation equations, there 
are some exceptions. For instance, Ray (2000) uses the available data on hours and wages to 
estimate a tobit model and – with no apparent justification- sets the wage for all non-working 
children equal to the smallest wage amongst working children. A tobit model is also 
estimated in Bhalotra and Heady (2000) but this is a reduced form: the wage data are not 
used. Hours of work conditional on participation are modeled in Bhalotra (2000a, 2000b) 
with sample selection correction. The only study we are aware of that has attempted to 
estimate the shadow wage from data on children in agricultural work is Cockburn (2002). 
6.2. Separability of Parent and Child Labor 
The labor supply of children is typically more variable than that of adults, and a 
significant degree of that variability can be explained in terms of their household 
circumstances - especially their non-labor income and household composition (especially 
fertility). It is therefore important to cast the labor supply decisions of children in a model of 
the household. In particular, child labor supply will tend to be jointly determined with the 
labor supply of parents and siblings. This has the implication that either the (actual or 
potential) wage rate or (in a conditional demand framework) the actual labor supply of other 
household members should appear as regressors in an equation describing child labor. If it is 
the participation and/or hours of parent work that appear in the model of child labor, they 
need to be instrumented. To neglect these variables amounts to assuming separability of 
parent and child labor supply. This is generally not acknowledged or investigated (an 
exception being Bhalotra (2000b)). 
6.3. Endogenous Fertility and Altruism 
An important difference between the labor supply of adults and children is that adults 
may be assumed to take their own decisions, while decisions relating to work and school for 
children are typically taken by parents. This has two interesting implications. First, 
(following Becker and Tomes (1976) and Becker (1991)) parent utility depends upon both 
the quantity and the quality of children. Thus fertility is jointly determined with investments  
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in child quality – including investments in education or work experience. With the exception 
of Cigno, Rosati and Tzannatos (2000), endogenous fertility has largely been ignored in the 
empirical literature on child labor. Indeed, most studies include household size and/or the 
number of children in the household as regressors in models of child labor.  
Second, if parents place a greater relative weight on their own consumption or leisure 
than on that of their children, then increases in adult income will translate less rapidly into 
child leisure or child school-attendance than otherwise. Theoretical models of child labor 
often assume a strong form of parent altruism
21 but it is important to recognize that agency 
issues arise when the decision-maker is not the child (see Section 5.3). This has potential 
implications for the empirical specification of an equation explaining child labor. For 
example, analysis of the LSMS data for rural Pakistan reveals that, even as parental 
selfishness is decisively rejected, households which consume tobacco spend significantly less 
on children, other things being equal (Bhalotra, 2001). The results are consistent with 
tobacco addiction, or with tobacco behaving like a subsistence good. They may also be 
interpreted to suggest that, given that men smoke four times as much as women in the sample 
for rural Pakistan, men are less concerned about child welfare than women, a view for which 
evidence has been noted in a related literature (1990, 1994). 
6.4. Multiple Choices 
Men’s decision to work can be quite adequately modeled as a choice between market 
work, self-employment and leisure. In the case of women, a third choice is home production 
(productive work within the households for which there is no explicit wage). In the case of 
children, a third choice is school attendance. The child labor supply decision involves 
allocation of time between labor, leisure and school. The basic assumptions are that leisure is 
a good and labor is a bad (that is, it affords disutility or people do not like it), and  it is 
probably reasonable to assume that the marginal utility of school attendance is positive. 
Labor brings the benefits of a wage income today (or of additional revenue if self-employed) 
as well as the benefit of experience accumulation and therefore higher wages tomorrow. 
Education also promises higher wages tomorrow, so time allocation has to weigh up these 
                                                                 
21 For example, Basu and Van (1998). Many other theoretical models of child labor assume altruism, although it 
may not be critical to the model (Baland and Robinson, 2000).  
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dynamic benefits since more education usually means less work experience. A dynamic 
model of the simultaneous choice between work, school and leisure, that allows for returns to 
both experience and education is presented, for example, in Bhalotra and Heady (2000), 
building upon a similar literature developed to model the choice between work, leisure and 
training amongst young adults.  
A further, more  empirical dimension to the problem of modeling time allocation 
across the three activities arises in terms of whether they are mutually exclusive or not. By 
definition, there is a conflict in time spent. Sometimes there is also a conflict between work 
and  school participation, as evident for wage work in South Asia. In some countries, 
especially in Africa, children combine work and school attendance on a fairly regular basis. 
In most countries, but to different extents, a substantial fraction of children are reported as 
being neither enrolled in school nor engaged in any regular income-generating activity. In 
view of these observations, some of the empirical research on child labor has defined four 
possible states: work only, school only, both, and neither.  
If types of work are distinguished, further states can be defined. The most commonly 
used estimation structure for this is the multinomial logit, although it has its problems, most 
particularly, the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (see Maddala 
(1983)). Papers using the multinomial logit include Cigno, Rosati and Tzannatos (2000), 
Rosati and Tzannatos (2000), Cartwright (1996), Cartwright and Patrinos (1997), Sasaki and 
Temesgen (1999), and Liu (1998).  
An alternative approach that has been used to deal with the fact that there are several 
possible outcomes to the time-allocation decision is the sequential probit (see Grootaert and 
Patrinos (1998), who present analyses of data for Cote d’Ivoire, Colombia, urban Bolivia and 
the Philippines). This approach has some attractive modeling features but it necessitates 
rather strong assumptions about the sequencing of decisions. In particular, these two authors 
assume that parents first decide whether the child attends school or not and then there is a 
further hierarchy of choices regarding the nature and extent of work participation and 
whether this is combined with other activities. In contexts where combining activities is 
uncommon, the simultaneity of the school and work decision can be modeled by estimating a 
bivariate probit which allows the unobservables in the work and school participation  
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equations to be correlated (see Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997), Coulombe (1998) and 
Nielsen (1998), Bhalotra and Angeriz (2002)). 
6.5. Endogeneity 
Some of the explanatory variables in commonly estimated models of child labor are 
endogenous, that is, correlated with the unobservables in the equation error. For example, 
household income is expected to have a negative effect on child labor but, at the same time, 
we may expect a positive effect flowing in the reverse direction as child labor contributes to 
household income. The simultaneity bias arising from neglecting to instrument household 
income will therefore be positive. This is important to recognize since many of the reviewed 
studies do not instrument income and many report an insignificant or even positive income 
effect (see Section 7.2).  
In his analysis of data from Cote d'Ivoire, Grootaert (1998) does not include any 
measure of income status as an explanatory variable on the grounds that it is likely to be 
endogenous. Some studies tackle endogeneity by subtracting the child’s contribution to 
income from reported household income – these include Ray (2000), Cartwright (1996) and 
Cartwright and Patrinos (1997). This approach has two problems. First, it is difficult to 
estimate the child’s contribution when the child works without an explicit wage on the 
household farm or enterprise, and this is the predominant form of child labor in developing 
countries. The assumptions made in imputing a wage to the child are often untenable (as, for 
example, in Ray, 2000) Second, even where it is possible to estimate child income and 
deduct it, adult income is not exogenous to the extent that child and adult labor supply are 
jointly determined (for evidence that this is the case in rural Pakistan, see Bhalotra 2000b). 
  This said, finding an instrument for income in the data is inherently difficult. 
Potentially good predictors of adult income or household income include parent education, 
parent occupation, the number of adults in the household and the value of land, livestock and 
other assets owned by the household. However, it is unclear that any of these can justifiably 
be excluded from the child labor equation. Some authors have used community-level 
instruments such as the presence of a shop, a road, a post-office, electricity supply, an index 
of land inequality and so on.  A possible objection to these instruments is that they capture 
village productivity effects. However, conditional on village-level wage rates, it may be  
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reasonable to exclude them from the child labor equation. They have good predictive power 
and are not rejected by a test of overidentifying restrictions, given an (arbitrary) initial 
restriction  (Bhalotra (2000a), Bhalotra and Heady (2000))
22. A persistent weakness of 
community-level instruments is that they reflect inter-village variation and involve some loss 
of information in regard to within-village differences in incomes.  
Identification of income effects on child labor is best done in situations where the 
data offer a natural experiment, that is, where some households receive a genuinely 
exogenous income transfer. Even in these cases, some delicate specification issues arise and 
modeling requires a fine understanding of program design, selection rules and any self-
selecting behavior. While such data are not easily available, they are becoming increasingly 
so. The response of child labor to exogenous income transfers has been analyzed by 
Ravallion and Wodon (2000) using data incorporating information on a school subsidy 
offered by an NGO in Bangladesh and by Martinelli and Parker (2000) and Bourguignon et 
al (2003), using data from the Progresa program in Mexico. Carvalho (2000) uses data on the 
introduction of an old-age pension to analyze the effects of an exogenous increase in income 
on child labor in three-generation households.  Using two years of data from the Vietnam 
LSMS, Edmonds (2001) identifies large effects of income growth on child labor incidence. 
  There are potentially endogenous variables other than income in a structural model of 
child labor. For example, the child wage, household size or acres of land leased in (or out), or 
sharecropped. Household size is typically included as a r egressor but not instrumented, 
though Cigno, Rosati and Tzannatos (2000) acknowledge endogenous fertility and exclude 
this variable. The child wage is typically not included as most of the surveyed studies 
estimate reduced form participation models. Exceptions include Ray (2000) who does not 
instrument it and Bhalotra (2000a) who instruments the individual child wage with the going 
agricultural wage for children in the community, investigating the overidentifying restriction 
associated with using the child’s completed schooling as an additional instrument. The 
decision to rent or sharecrop land is endogenized in Bhalotra and Heady (2000) who 
instrument it with land owned and an index of land inequality in the village. In conditional 
                                                                 
22 It is good practice to report tests of both the strength and validity of instruments and to show comparable OLS 
estimates along with the IV estimates because weak instruments not only produce inefficient estimates but can 
also produce biases (Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995).  
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demand models that incorporate schooling, sibling activity or parent labor supply as 
regressors, these variables are endogenous. The hours worked by the mother and father 
appear as regressors in Bhalotra (2000b), where they are instrumented by indicators of parent 
illness in the w eek preceding the survey. Oveidentifying restrictions associated with 
community variables and with the education and age of the parents (including interactions 
between education and age and between these variables for mother and father) are 
investigated (education and age are commonly used as instruments in labor economics even 
though they are, in principle, questionable). The completed school years of the child is 
included as a regressor in Bourguignon et al (2003) and Bhalotra (1999a). The papers we 
surveyed do not contain instances where sibling activity status appears as an explanatory 
variable, and, if it did, it would be endogenous. 
6.6. Measurement Error 
It is difficult to obtain accurate assessments of household income in general and this 
problem is particularly acute for rural households. A large fraction of their income may be 
derived from self-employment and a varying fraction may be directly consumed rather than 
sold. Also, agricultural incomes are volatile, making measured income sensitive to the 
reference period of the survey. For this reason, total expenditure is often used in place of 
income, there being evidence that even poor households perform some smoothing of 
consumption (Townsend 1994). However, measurement error will tend to creep into 
estimates of total expenditure on account of having to impute value to home-produced 
consumption or measure the value of services from durables or –typically not attempted- 
include the value of leisure consumed.  
  Classical measurement error biases coefficients towards zero. The common way of 
addressing this problem is to use instrumental variables, the alternatives for which were 
discussed in the preceding section. An alternative approach is to estimate M-demands rather 
than the standard Marshallian demands (see Bhalotra 2001, Browning 1998). This involves 
replacing total expenditure with expenditure on a reference good. It seems plausible that most 
data will offer a candidate reference good that is measured with less error than total  
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expenditure, since it i s in arriving at the total that the problems of having to deal with 
durables, leisure or imputed values for non-purchased goods arise
23.  
  Additional measurement issues are associated with using data on hours of work.  
6.7. Aggregation 
Interpretation of results for policy or other purposes should be sensitive to the manner 
in which the sample is defined. The surveyed studies tend to pool data by age, gender, region 
(rural/urban), and type of child labor (wage work, work on household farms and enterprises). 
Separation of these samples suggests that the pooling restrictions do not hold. Imposing slope 
heterogeneity will tend to yield biased estimates. 
6.8. Definitions 
The researcher has a choice of definitions, both of child labor and of explanatory 
variables. Related to the preceding section, the researcher chooses what categories of work 
are included in the definition of child labor and, in particular, whether it refers to wage work; 
work on family farms and enterprises; domestic work, or a combination of all of these. The 
first typically involves being employed for long hours outside the home whereas the second 
and third involve working for the family and are more compatible with school attendance. 
Under labor and land market imperfections, the opportunity cost of sending a child to school 
is larger for landowners and, indeed, larger the larger is the size of land owned.  
A second definitional issue is whether the dependent variable is participation or 
hours of work conditional on participation or, indeed, hours of work unconditional on 
participation. The evidence is that the elasticity of labor supply – with respect to income and 
wage rates- tends to be higher for participation than for hours (see Heckman 1994). A third 
choice relates to selecting the age range of children. This lies between about 7 and 18 in the 
studies surveyed. One might expect larger elasticities of, for example, income, for younger 
                                                                 
23 For example, in an empirical application that investigates parent altruism in the context of child labor, 
Bhalotra (2001) uses expenditures on adult goods as the reference good. In his empirical illustration for 
commodity demand in the UK, Browning defines food expenditure as the reference good. Now food 
expenditure or adult-goods expenditure are directly reported in most surveys. While they may be reported with 
some error, the measurement error in these variables will tend to be smaller than in total expenditure because 
there is now no need to construct a value for expenditure on leisure or expenditure on durable goods.  
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children. There is a similar issue of distinguishing enrolment in school from attendance and, 
further, progression and achievement at school. 
As this is a variable of central interest, consider alternative definitions of household 
income or living standards. First, the available studies differ in whether they use food 
expenditure, total expenditure or current income. Some directly use indices of asset 
ownership and some use both a measure of current income and of assets. The possible 
conflation of wealth and incentive effects associated with productive assets is modeled in 
Cockburn (2000) and Bhalotra and Heady (2000) and discussed in Cigno, Rosati and 
Tzannatos (2000), Rosati and Tzannatos (2000) and Andvig (1999). As discussed in Section 
5.4, including assets alone can result in ambiguous “income effects”. A second issue relates 
to adjusting the measure of resources for demographic differences between households. 
Either the income measure is defined in adult-equivalent terms or, alternatively, the equation 
includes controls for household size and composition. There is considerable heterogeneity in 
the reviewed studies in this regard: some control for household size but not composition, 
others control for both. Interpretation of the resulting elasticities should be sensitive to these 
differences in specification. 
6.9. Functional Form 
Most studies use linear or log-linear specifications although, for variables such as 
income or acres of land owned, one may expect non-linear effects. For instance, both 
Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) and Bhalotra and Heady (2000) find a quadratic effect of 
income on child labor. The non-parametric relation of child labor with income and the child 
wage is described in Bhalotra (2000a, Figures 3 & 4), and that of child labor and income in 
Edmonds (2001). These studies suggest that a log-linear specification is restrictive. 
The empirical literature on child labor involves a range of limited dependent variable 
models: univariate and bivariate probits, sequential probits, multinomial logits and tobits 
(Section 6.4). These differ in the assumed distribution of the error term and in their 
assumptions about the manner in which the choice set is sequenced and arrayed. Their results 
are therefore not directly comparable. Marginal effects are often reported at sample means 
but it may be interesting to see the distribution of marginal effects corresponding to the  
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distribution of the explanatory variables. This is seldom reported, Cockburn (2001) being a 
notable exception. 
6.10. Conditioning Variables 
Many of the regressors are correlated and any marginal effect or elasticity will 
depend upon what other variables it is conditioned upon. For instance, the income elasticity 
may depend upon whether the equation controls for household size and composition and the 
value of  productive assets.  It has also been shown to depend upon whether  parents’ 
employment status is held constant: for example, Bhalotra (2001b) shows that the income 
effect rises threefold when hours of work of both parents are held constant. 
6.11. Data Needs 
The forgoing discussion suggests ways in which the collection of data may be 
improved to assist research and policy formulation. First, it is extremely useful to have panel 
data that permit following a child for some years. This would allow us to study the dynamics 
of work and school participation, a good illustration of which is in Sawada and Lokshin 
(2001) who use a panel of data for twenty-five villages in Pakistan to examine the sequential 
nature of schooling decisions. It would also allow us to control for child-specific time-
invariant unobservables such as inherent ability and health endowments (see Bhalotra and 
Angeriz 2002 and Cockburn 2002 for attempts to do this using alternative methods with 
cross-sectional data).  
Second, data collection needs to be designed to permit program evaluation. This 
involves collecting data before and after the start of a program, allowing sufficiently long 
intervals at each end to avoid program announcement effects (before the start of the program) 
and to allow the program to take full effect (after it has started). Such data should be 
collected for both  “treatment” and “control” groups. A fine illustration of an attempt to do 
this is in the case of Progresa, a major policy intervention in progress in Mexico (Skoufias 
and Parker 2001). Experimental data of this sort overcome the need for instrumental 
variables by providing information that can be used to estimate causal effects.  
Third, it would be useful to supplement household survey data like the LSMS data 
with surveys of children who do not live in households. The ILO has, in the last decade,  
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conducted a number of rapid assessment surveys in developing countries with this objective. 
The surveys and reports can be found via www.ilo.org. Attempts to combine information 
from these surveys with the information in household survey data to build a consistent 
picture of child labor for an economy are still scarce.  
Fourth, time allocation surveys experimenting with alternative recall periods are 
merited. These will provide useful information for some of the following reasons. Some 
children combine work and school and others do neither: it is especially useful then to 
understand exactly how their time is allocated. Since we are interested not only in 
participation in work but in how many hours it consumes and since we are interested not only 
in attendance at school but in how much time the child has to study or rest, it is again useful 
to know how residual time is spent.   
Fifth, multi-topic surveys of the style that are available (see Section 2.2) may be 
expanded to include information on (retrospective) income shocks/variability (see Section 
7.18), availability and use of credit (distinguishing credit available for consumption and 
business purposes), the question of what, if any, collateral rural households offer for credit 
(whether this is primarily land: see Section 5.4 above), property rights, inheritance laws 
(refer Section 5.4) and questions regarding the individual household’s experience of trying to 
hire or supply labor (again see Section 5.4). Indicators of the activity levels of labor markets 
for adults and children and also of land and credit markets would be useful to have though 
some thought needs to be given to how best to define such indicators. 
7. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH : A REVIEW 
This section reviews the findings of the relatively recent crop of empirical papers on 
child labor that analyze micro-data from a number of developing countries. While these have 
contributed substantially to identifying the correlates of child labor, there remains 
considerable scope for further research into the causes of child labor. This requires rather 
sharper tests than we have seen, motivated by explicit theoretical models. The econometric 
specifications used also need to be tightened and more closely related to theory.  
We have reviewed about thirty empirical studies. There is little to be gained in taking 
the median of elasticities or conducting a meta-analysis since the choice of sample and the 
equation specification are typically not comparable. Instead, we present an broader overview  
 28 
of  the results. The reader will notice the wide range of estimates which, as discussed in 
Section 6, may reflect specification errors rather than genuine geographic diversity. 
Following Section 7.1, results are organized by explanatory variable. In each sub-Section, we 
indicate expected effects and potential misspecifications before proceeding to describe the 
findings of the different studies.    
7.1. Parent Altruism 
Altruism is investigated by the method described in Section 5.3 using the 1991 LSMS 
for rural Pakistan, a region where both child labor and child malnutrition are prevalent in 
households that live above the poverty line. The data are consistent with altruism but, at the 
same time, they reveal that households that smoke (buy tobacco) spend significantly less on 
children, other things being equal. This is argued to be consistent with tobacco being 
addictive or, alternatively with men (the dominant smokers) being less altruistic than women 
(Bhalotra, 2001).  
The latter implies heterogeneity in preferences between parents. This is investigated 
for Indonesia by Galasso (2000), who rejects preference homogeneity. Andvig (1999) raises 
the issue of child labor being dependent upon whether the family system is patrinlineal or 
matrilineal. The possibility that biological children are favored over non-biological children 
in the allocation of work within the household is investigated in Bhalotra (2000a) and 
Bhalotra and Heady (2000). The hypothesis is rejected for family-farm work in Pakistan 
where children of heads of household are more likely to work, indicating that this kind of 
child work may be motivated to train children who are going to inherit the land. For Ghana, 
on the other hand, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that sons of the head of 
household work less. There is a similar negative sign for daughters but this coefficient is 
poorly determined. The question is more interesting when posed for an African country as 
child fostering happens there on a fairly large scale (see Ainsworth, 1996).  
7.2. Household Poverty    
7.2.1. Small income effects on child labor 
One of the most striking findings that emerges in surveying the empirical literature on 
child labor is that both its unconditional and conditional correlation with household poverty  
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is small, and often insignificant. An insignificant income effect is reported, for example, in 
Coulombe (1998, Cote d’Ivoire), Sasaki and Temesgen (1999, Peru), Patrinos and 
Psacharapoulos (1997, Peru), Ilahi (1999, rural boys in Peru) and Ray (2000, Pakistan). A 
positive coefficient on income is obtained in Cartwright (1996, household farm/enterprise 
work in rural Colombia) and in Patrinos and Psacharapoulos (1994, Paraguay). Negative 
income effects are found in Cartwright (1996, wage work in rural Colombia), Cigno and 
Rosati (2000, rural India), Ilahi (1999, rural girls in Peru), Rosati and Tzannatos (2000, 
Vietnam), Liu (1998, wage work in Vietnam), Ray (2000, Peru), Bhalotra and Heady (2000, 
boys in Pakistan and girls in Ghana, both in rural farm work).  In a review of empirical 
studies of Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Zambia, Canagarajah and Nielsen (1999) conclude that 
there is not much evidence in favor of the view that poverty is a very important cause of child 
labor. In her survey of field studies of child labor in India, Bhatty (1998) concludes that there 
is no clear association between poverty and child labor. The rest of this Section presents an 
illustrative selection of sizes, while Section 7.2.4. offers a more detailed consideration of the 
specifications used in some of these studies, which puts the numbers in context.   
Using data for rural India, Cigno, Rosati and Tzannatos (2000) find a marginal effect 
of income on participation in “work-only” of  -0.52 and a larger effect of  –0.78 on 
participation in “work-and-study”. They show that raising a household from the poorest to 
the least-poor category would only reduce the probability of being in work by 4%. Other 
studies have found no effect of income. For example, Patrinos and Psacharapoulos (1997) 
report a marginal effect of zero of income on the probability that school-going children work 
in Peru. Some find a positive effect – for instance, Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) report 
a positive effect of per capita wealth on child labor in Ghana.  
 Now consider two comparable studies, one of which refers to wage-working children 
and the other of which refers to children employed on family farms. Both studies separate the 
samples for boys and girls and are restricted to rural areas and both instrument income. 
Conditional on participation, the income elasticity of hours of work for children in wage 
work in rural Pakistan  is –0.17 for boys and –0.34 for girls (Bhalotra, 2000a). This means 
that a 10% increase in income will result in a decrease in work of about one hour in the case 
of both boys and girls, the proportionate decline being larger for girls because their average  
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hours of work are smaller (31 hours a week as opposed to 45 hours a week for boys)
24. 
Alternatively, consider how much child hours of work would decline if we got the average 
household in the bottom quartile of the living standards distribution into the second quartile. 
Measuring living standards as per capita food expenditure, this involves a 60% increase in 
the case of rural Pakistan. A simple model of labor supply predicts a decline of 6 hours: 
down from 45 to 39 a week in the case of boys and down from 31 to 25 a week in the case of 
girls. So, even a 60% increase in income does not reduce child labor enough in this sample to 
make school attendance feasible. This underlines how small the effect of household income 
is. Is it any different for children that work for the family farm or enterprise? Estimates of 
income effects on hours obtained from a tobit run, for comparability, on rural Pakistan show 
that the gender differential is turned around and the elasticities are significantly different: the 
income elasticity is now zero for girls and –0.66 for boys. (see Bhalotra and Heady, 2000)
25. 
A 10% increase in income reduces boys’ farm work by 1.2 hours, which is larger than the 
impact on wage work as average hours in farm work are, at 15 hours a week, smaller. The 
same study also reports estimates for children working on family farms in rural Ghana. Here, 
the income elasticity is zero for boys and –0.20 for girls. An increase in income of 10% 
reduces girls’ work by only 0.3 hours, from an average of 15 hours a week.  
In contrast, Edmonds (2001) finds that income growth in Vietnam can account for a 
large part of the reduction in child labor observed in this country during the 1990s. Carvalho 
(2000) finds that the introduction of an old-age pension in Brazil resulted in a reduction in 
child labor amongst children living with grandparents, the impact of a grandmother’s pension 
on her granddaughters’ labor being especially large. It is unclear whether these relatively 
large income effects reflect real differences associated with Vietnam and Brazil or whether 
they reflect the weight of different methodologies. Edmonds has access to two years of data 
on Vietnam and Carvalho has data from a natural experiment. More robust estimates can 
certainly be obtained with these better data sources. It is nevertheless puzzling that such a 
                                                                 
24 How large is this? Consider that the average household in this sample spends only 2% of its budget on 
education. So a policy that promises to relieve households of school costs would be more modest than a 10% 
increase in incomes. 
25 The different elasticities we obtain when the data are sub-sampled by gender and types of work show that 
aggregation can yield spurious results (see Section 6.7).  
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large body of previous research finds small income effects and further research on this 
subject is merited. 
7.2.2. Small income effects on schooling 
Although child labor is not the inverse of schooling because a non-trivial fraction of 
children are, at any time, engaged in neither or both (see Section 3), it is interesting to 
consider whether  the association of poverty and schooling is any stronger than the 
association of poverty and child labor (on which see Section 5). Estimates of income 
elasticities for a range of indicators of educational enrollment and attainment are surveyed in 
Behrman and Knowles (1999) for the US and a number of developing countries. The median 
elasticity, at 0.07, is small, though somewhat larger estimates of about 0.20, are observed for 
lower income regions. In their own analysis of five indicators of schooling in Vietnam in 
1996, Behrman and Knowles find rather higher income elasticities than the previous 
literature. This is at least partly on account of their more careful attention to the choice of 
indicators and the specification of the equation. 
Their work on schooling therefore has two important lessons for us. First, a majority 
of studies find a weak relation of poverty and schooling just as a majority of studies seem to 
find a weak relation of poverty and child labor. Second, we cannot read too much into this 
since the results of a majority of studies of both schooling and child labor are probably not 
robust to specification errors. Although we indicate here that, even after a more careful 
analysis of the data, the impact of poverty on child labor is not as large and universal as we 
may have expected, we need to accumulate more such evidence before we can draw wide-
ranging conclusions. 
7.2.3. Income effects by gender 
Income elasticities of participation and hours of child work are typically higher for 
girls than for boys,
26 a result that is paralleled in analyses of schooling (see Ilahi (1999), 
Ravallion and Wodon (2000), Behrman and Knowles (1999), Bhalotra (2000a)). This 
                                                                 
26 As discussed above, the gender differential is reversed in a sample restricted to farm workers in rural 
Pakistan. It is not reversed for a similar sample in rural Ghana. Various institutional and economic differences 
probably bear on this such as gender asymmetries in inheritance laws and the relative scarcity (and therefore the 
relative value) of land.  
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suggests that education is more a luxury good for girls than for boys, which is consistent with 
the fact that in many traditional societies, educated women do not seek employment or, when 
they do, they earn a lower wage than men with comparable education.  
7.2.4. Context: Specifications underlying income effects 
In their paper on rural India, Cigno, Rosati and Tzannatos (2000) directly use 
household income, measured to include earnings as well as own-production. It is not 
instrumented and no adjustment is made for the fact that it refers to the current period (period 
of the survey). The authors estimate a multinomial logit model for the alternative states of 
activity observed in the Indian data (work only, work and school, school only). Income has a 
negative effect on the probability that the child only works, though no effect on the 
probability of being in the other two states. This is not inconsistent with economic theory 
which predicts a negative effect only in the case where the choice is effectively between 
work and leisure (see Section 5.1).  
Cartwright (1996) uses data from Colombia to estimate a sequential probit model in 
which the hierarchy of choices refers to the decision to work with or without a second 
activity, the decision to just work, the decision to work for wages, and the decision to work 
on a family enterprise. She measures income as reported income minus the child’s earnings. 
For rural areas, she finds a significantly negative effect of this on the probabilities of the first 
three stages but a positive effect in the fourth stage. For rural areas, she finds a negative 
effect in stages one and three and insignificant effects in the other two stages. The result that 
it is worth hanging on to is that in both rural and urban areas, there is a negative income 
effect on wage work and not on work on the household enterprise. Using urban Bolivian data 
to estimate the same specification, Cartwright and Patrinos (1997) find significantly negative 
effects for the first stage only. 
Using reported household income again, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1995) identify 
a negative and significant effect on the probability of combining school with child labor (as 
opposed to school alone) in Paraguay. Using the same binary logit specification on data from 
Peru in their 1997 paper, these authors find no significant effect of income. This result is 
confirmed by Sasaki and Temesgen (1999) who again use reported income per capita. They 
estimate a multinomial logit (allowing work only, school only, both and neither as  
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independent choices) for the same Peruvian data and find that income is insignificant in each 
of the three equations. A binary probit with random household (check that these effects are 
indeed for the household) effects estimated using two years of the Peru survey and separating 
equations by gender produces the same insignificant result for income measured as log of 
household wealth per capita (Ilahi, 1999). However, when Ilahi interacts the wealth variable 
with the rural residence dummy, he identifies a significant negative effect for rural areas, 
though only for girls. Comparison of the results of different studies for Peru indicate that the 
result can be more sensitive to the choice of sub sample than to econometric specification.  
Using the full sample of Ghana data for 1991/2 and pooling data for boys and girls, 
Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) find a positive but decreasing effect of the log of per 
capita total expenditure on the probability of child work. They allow for a correlation of 
unobservables determining work and school by estimating a bivariate probit, but they do not 
allow for endogeneity of income status. Bhalotra and Heady (2000) use a quadratic in the 
logarithm of per capita food expenditure which is a relatively smooth measure of household 
welfare status. They estimate tobit models for boys and girls in the sample of rural 
households that own or operate farm land in Ghana and Pakistan. They identify a significant 
negative effect of income status on child work hours in the case of girls in Ghana and boys in 
Pakistan. There is no significant effect of income on work for boys in Ghana or for girls in 
Pakistan. In all cases, food expenditure is instrumented using community level variables. 
Comparison of IV with OLS estimates shows that the OLS estimates carry the expected 
upward bias on the income coefficient.  
7.3. Wage Elasticities 
It is uncommon for studies of child labor to include the child wage as a regressor- 
most econometric analyses of child labor have estimated reduced form participation 
equations. In their studies of household production and time allocation, Levy (1985), 
Rosenzweig (1981) and Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) find positive wage elasticities for 
child work force participation in the rural areas of Egypt and India respectively, but negative 
wage elasticities are ruled out by construction in their models.  
Turning from research on child labor to the larger literature on labor supply, there is 
some evidence of negative wage elasticities for hours of work of adult men though these are  
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typically found at high wage levels (see Attanasio and MaCurdy (1997), Kniesner (1976) for 
the US, Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986) for the Netherlands). Negative wage elasticities at 
low wages have been found for Mexico (Hernandez-Licona, 1996) and rural India 
(Rosenzweig, 1980) using data on adults. Looking at children here sharpens the question: 
Since the earnings of adults provide non-labor income for children, we would expect forward 
falling labor supply curves to be less likely to be observed for children than for adults.
27  
Bhalotra (2000a) presents a model of labor supply incorporating subsistence 
constraints and estimates it on data for children engaged in wage work in rural Pakistan, who 
comprise 10% of the 10-14 year-old population. As discussed in Section 5.2, own-wage 
elasticities for children carry more information than income elasticities because they indicate 
whether the substitution effect is dominated by the income effect or not. The paper identifies 
a significantly negative wage elasticity of hours of work for boys and an elasticity not 
significantly different from zero for girls. This is a striking result. It suggests that boys work 
when it is necessary, that is, when household poverty compels them to. This is much less 
clear in the case of girls. So, while raising the expected returns to school may draw girls out 
of work and into school, these results indicate that households in which boys are engaged in 
wage work cannot afford the opportunity cost of schooling. In this case, investments in 
school quality or other measures designed to raise the return to schooling will not draw them 
out of work. Instead, income transfers to households supplying child labor may be more 
effective, especially if conditional on the child attending school.  
7.4. Parental Education     
Policy interventions should consider not just the direct impact of mother’s education 
on child labor and schooling but also the likely indirect effect working through reduced 
fertility. The absolute level of women’s education is very low in most developing countries 
and the returns are often very high (Appleton 1999). Since uneducated daughters tend to 
grow up to produce uneducated daughters and since female education is known to generate 
                                                                 
27 For the village economies that we are concerned with, we can safely ignore “backward bending” labor supply 
behavior which occurs only at high wage levels. The negative wage elasticity associated with subsistence 
constraints occurs at low wage levels, yielding a “forward falling” labor supply curve.  
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strong social externalities (Sen 1999) there is a strong case for policy interventions that 
promote female education. 
Most studies include parents’ education, treating mothers and fathers separately but a 
number of those discussed below only consider the education of one parent, more often the 
father. About half the studies enter a set of dummy variables for level of education attained, 
that is, indicators for no-education, primary, middle or secondary level education. The others 
use years of education instead: in these studies this term almost always appears linearly even 
though the data appear to support non-linearities, reflecting either increasing or decreasing 
returns or else sheepskin effects. Of course, if the true effect  is non-linear, a linear 
specification may misleadingly show insignificance.  
In interpretation of coefficients on parents’ education, it is important to know what 
variables are held constant in the estimation. In particular, if household income is not 
adequately controlled for then any effect of the education of parents will tend to include an 
income effect since more educated parents tend to earn more or to be richer. If income is held 
constant and we find that the children of educated parents are less likely to work, then a 
plausible interpretation of the education effect is in terms of attitudes to child work, 
aspirations for the child’s future, and/or subjective degrees of time preference.   
There is more or less consistent evidence that mothers’ education has a negative 
effect on child labor, and the size of this effect often exceeds that flowing from fathers’ 
education. However, there is considerable variation around this statement. Canagarajah and 
Coulombe (1997) find a negative effect on child work participation of fathers’ secondary-
level education and no effect of mother’s education in Ghana, using data combined for boys 
and girls in rural and urban areas. Using the same LSMS data but isolating rural children and 
separating girls and boys produces a negative effect of mothers’ middle or secondary level 
education for boys but no effect of fathers’ education (Bhalotra and Heady, 2001).  
On family farms in rural Pakistan, mothers’ middle or secondary level education has a 
negative effect for boys and girls (larger in the case of girls) and fathers’ secondary education 
has a negative effect that is restricted to girls (Bhalotra and Heady, 2001). In rural India, 
estimates indicate that the children of mothers with less than primary education are 
significantly more likely to be in full-time work as compared with full-time study, and that  
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having a mother who completed middle school reduces the probability of combining work 
and school as compared with full-time study. Fathers’ education has no significant effect 
(Cigno and Rosati, 2000). An older study based on the 1961 Census of India indicates a 
negative effect of father’s education on boy’s work with no effect flowing from mother’s 
education (Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977).  
Negative effects of mother’s and father’s education are identified for child labor in 
Bangladesh (Ravallion and Wodon, 1999). Father’s education has a negative effect on child 
labor in urban areas of the Philippines whereas, in rural areas, there appears to be a positive 
effect (see Sakellariou and Lall, 1997); these authors do not investigate mother’s education. 
In Vietnam, years of father’s education has no effect on child labor but mother’s education 
has a negative impact on the probability of work as well as on the probability of being neither 
in work nor in school (Rosati and Tzannatos, 2000). However, Liu (1998) finds insignificant 
effects of both mother’s and father’s years of schooling on child labor in Vietnam, whether 
market or home based. 
The probability of combining work and school as compared with the probability of 
full-time study is found to be reduced by years of fathers’ education in Peru (Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos, 1997) and by years of mother’s education in Paraguay (Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos, 1995). However, using the same Peruvian data for 1994, Sasaki and 
Temesgen (1999) find that the probability of combining work and school as compared with 
full-time study is reduced by both father’s college education and mother’s secondary and 
college level education. While the first study uses a binomial logit, the second uses a 
multinomial logit, allowing for two further outcomes: work only and neither work nor 
school. Mother’s education has no effect on these outcomes relative to study only. Father’s 
secondary education has a negative effect on the probability of work only relative to study 
only. Controlling for household-specific effects using a random effects probit on the 
Peruvian data for two rounds (1994 and 1997), Ilahi (1999) finds a negative effect of the 
education of the oldest prime-age female on the probability of children working in an 
income-generating activity in Peru, and this effect appears to be similar for rural and urban 
areas.   
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While the results of the three studies for Peru do not contradict one another, here is 
one more instance of how statements like “mothers’ education is more important than 
fathers’ education in reducing child labor” need to be qualified with more specific 
information about what sub-sample is being discussed and in relation to what, and whether 
the education effects are allowed to be nonlinear.  
In Colombia, multinomial logit estimates reported in Cartwright (1993)
28 indicate 
that, with full-time study as the reference category, there is a negative effect of fathers’ years 
of schooling on the probability of full-time child work whether this is for wages, on the 
family farm or enterprise, or it is full-time home care. Interestingly, mothers’ years of 
schooling has no effect on child labor that produces marketable goods but it has a positive 
effect on the probability that a child is at home in full-time care. The study does not 
distinguish boys and girls but this result is consistent with the view that educated women take 
work and, as a result, their children may have to substitute them at home at the expense of 
going to school. These effects are similar in rural and urban areas, the effects of mother’s 
education being stronger in urban areas.  
In their analysis of child labor in urban Bolivia, Cartwright and Patrinos (1997) find a 
negative effect of mother’s years of education on the probability of children working in 
income-generating activities as opposed to being in school. Unlike in the case of Colombia, 
there is no effect of mother’s education on child time in home-care. They do not include 
father’s education in the model.  
Data from Cote d'Ivoire, Colombia, Bolivia and the Philippines are analyzed within a 
sequential probit framework in Grootaert and Patrinos (1999) providing some comparable 
results and they indicate a negative effect of parent’s education on child labor. 
In Cote d'Ivoire, the probability of full-time study as opposed to full-time work (in a 
sequential decision-making regime) is positively influenced by years of fathers’ education in 
urban areas and by years of mothers’ education in rural areas, in each case the education of 
the other parent having no effect. The other results are identical for rural and urban regions: 
Both fathers’ and mother’s education raise the probability of a child combining school with 
work as opposed to working full-time, and parents education has no effect on whether  
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children work or are neither in school nor in work (Grootaert, 1988). Analysis of the same 
Cote d’Ivoire data by Coulombe (1998) using a bivariate probit suggests no effect of father’s 
schooling on either work or school participation. Mother’s education has no effect on work 
although it does influence school participation. Nielsen (1998) also finds no effect of father’s 
schooling on child work or school decisions in bivariate probit estimates of data for Zambia, 
but she does not investigate mother’s schooling. No parental education effects are identified 
in the data analysis for Turkey by Tunali (1997). 
7.5. Farm Size and Mode of Operation 
As indicated in Section 3, the vast majority of working children live in rural areas and 
work on farms, predominantly family-run farms. Since family-owned land denotes wealth at 
the same time as it denotes employment opportunities, the behavior of labor supply for 
children in farming households is likely to be different from that of other children and it 
raises new modeling questions (see discussion of the wealth paradox in Section 5.4). The 
wealth effect may be separated from the other (substitution) effects of farm size if both farm 
size  and a measure of permanent income are included in the model. This distinction is 
ultimately relevant, for example, to policy consideration of income transfers versus land 
reform. 
  Land tenancy f orms are also likely to affect the probability of child work. For 
instance, one rationalization of the benefits to the landlord from pursuing sharecropping 
instead of renting the land out or hiring wage labor in, is that it improves the landlord’s 
access to labor by making available the labor of the tenant’s family in addition to the labor of 
the tenant (Basu, 1997). The  sub-division of land across household members may also 
influence child labor, either for reasons of productivity (scale efficiency and also input-
allocation (see Udry, 1996, for example) or for reasons of bargaining (Iversen 2000). In sub-
Saharan Africa, in contrast to Asia, it is not uncommon for a household to own more than 
one plot of land and, indeed, for the plots to be controlled by different members of the 
household, men and women. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
28 Cartwright also presents estimates using sequential probit estimation but as they are not strictly comparable, 
to avoid confusion, only the multinomial logit results are presented here.  
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What is the evidence? Not many of the studies reviewed include a measure of land 
owned by the household. Consider those that do. Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) find no 
effect of farm size on child work participation rates in Ghana. Distinguishing boys and girls 
and restricting the sample to rural farming households, Bhalotra and Heady (2000) find a 
positive effect of farm size on girls’ work, though no effect for boys. Cigno and Rosati 
(2000) find a positive effect of land size on child labor in rural India, combining data on girls 
and boys. In Vietnam, the size of cultivable land owned by the household raises the 
probability that children will combine work with school as opposed to studying full time but 
it does not raise the probability of full-time work. Relative to study, not surprisingly, owning 
land reduces the probability that a child engages in neither work nor school (Rosati and 
Tzannatos, 2000). 
The only study, it appears, that includes indicators of the form of land tenancy in the 
empirical model is Bhalotra and Heady (2000), which analyses data for rural regions of 
Ghana and Pakistan. The Pakistan data permit a distinction between owning, sharecropping 
and renting land. In Ghana, additional modes of operation are “free land” and village 
(community) land. Holding constant a quadratic in acres of land owned, they identify the 
following effects. All Ghanaian children and Pakistani girls are more likely to work in 
households that rent land, and Pakistani boys are more likely to work in households that 
sharecrop land. Free farms raise work participation in Ghana amongst boys and girls and 
village farms raise participation amongst girls alone. The estimates for Ghana show that, at a 
given land acreage, the number of plots of land owned by a household also raises child labor, 
a result that might be investigated further by modeling bargaining between the men and 
women that own the different plots, allowing for heterogeneity in parental preferences over 
their children (see Iversen 2000).  
7.6. Household Size 
It has been argued that children from larger households are more likely to work, as a 
consequence of resources per person being smaller in larger households (Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos, 1997). However, we w ould not expect this association to persist after 
controlling for household income per equivalent adult. An alternative basis for positing a 
correlation of household size and child labor is that fertility may be encouraged by the  
 40 
prospects for child work (Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), Cain (1977), Singh and Schuh 
(1986), Eswaran (1998), Bardhan and Udry (1999)). In this case, it may be argued that 
desired household size is endogenous in the child hours model (see Section 6.5). 
Nevertheless it is not uncommon to treat current household size as if it were exogenous – 
both because it is very difficult to find a valid instrument and because it might be argued that 
relations identified in cross-sectional data represent long-run resolutions (Deaton 1997). The 
alternative is to suppress size from the model and replace it with exogenous determinants of 
fertility- an option that has largely been averted in this literature.  
Since size and composition are clearly correlated, the relation between household size 
and child work will depend upon whether household composition is held constant. Jensen and 
Nielsen (1996) and Psacharopoulos (1997), for example, include assets and size but not 
composition of the household. Kassouf (1998), Jensen (1999), Canagarajah and Coulombe 
(1998), Grootaert (1998) and Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) include income (assumed 
exogenous) and composition, but size does not appear independently.  The relation of 
household size and child labor will also depend, in rural areas, upon whether farm size is 
held constant. Controlling for land size, we may expect child hours of work to be decreasing 
in household size because of diminishing returns. In general, if an empirical equation for 
child labor includes household size it should also include (instrumented) income, 
comprehensive indices of household composition and, in rural areas, land size and indicators 
for tenancy structure. 
The empirical results support some variety (see Cochrane, Kozel and Alderman, 
1990) but there is a tendency to find a positive association of household size and child 
work
29. However, this finding cannot be regarded as robust since the studies differ in whether 
or not land size and household composition are held constant. Estimates of an equation with 
this set of controls yields negative effects of household size on child hours of work for boys 
in rural Pakistan (no effect for girls) and for girls in rural Ghana (no effect for boys) (see 
Bhalotra and Heady, 2000). Cigno, Rosati and Tzannatos (2000) also find a negative effect 
for participation in work in rural India. Ilahi (1999) finds a negative effect for boys and no 
effect for girls in Peru. Also using data from Peru, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) find a  
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negative effect of the number of siblings (not household size) on t he probability of 
combining work and school relative to the probability of simply attending school if the 
number of children not in school is held constant (insignificant if this control variable is not 
included).  
For Vietnam, Rosati and Tzannatos (1999)  find a significant negative effect of 
household size on the probability of being in work and on the probability of combining work 
and school, relative to the probability of simply being in school. There is no effect for the 
children who report being in neither work nor school.  
Positive estimated effect of household size on child work are found in Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos (1995), who, for Paraguay (in contrast to Peru), find a positive effect of the 
number of siblings (not household size) on the probability of combining work and school 
relative to the probability of simply attending school. 
7.7. Household Composition 
Standard compositional effects refer to the  age and gender structure of the 
household. Additional compositional effects that may be taken into account are whether both 
parents are alive and whether they are present in the household (or have, for example, 
migrated away for work). The LSMS data usually include information on these variables. 
There is some evidence that children - and especially girls - with more siblings work 
longer hours on average (see Lloyd (1993) and Jomo (1992)). This is likely to be a more 
pronounced effect when the siblings are younger than the index child, since higher birth 
order children are often more likely to be in w ork.  Most studies include indicators of 
household composition (discussed above) but few directly include birth order effects: see Oto 
and Moffatt (2002) for an exception in a case study for India, and see Browning (1992) for a 
discussion of specifications for birth order effects.  
Grootaert (1998) finds no clear evidence of sibling effects in Cote d’Ivoire although 
Coulombe (1998), using the same data, finds that the number of children under-6 raises work 
participation for older children. In Vietnam, both the number of siblings under 6 (pre-school) 
and the number of school-age siblings (6-15 years) raises the probability of school-age 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
29 King (1987) reviews the literature on the association of large family size with adverse welfare outcomes for 
children including health and educational attainment.  
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children being at work (Rosati and Tzannatos, 2000). This is confirmed for per-school 
children by Liu (1998). Ilahi (1999) finds no household composition effects on child labor in 
Peru. Using the same data, Sasaki and Temesgen (1999) confirm that the number of children 
in the household does not affect full-time work participation of children in Peru but they find 
it does increase the probabilities of school and work and of being engaged in neither, relative 
to full-time study. On the other hand, estimates of binary probits in Ray (2000) suggest a 
positive effect of the number of siblings on work probabilities in Peru.  
The presence of younger siblings discourages work participation amongst girls in 
rural Ghana, household composition having no effect on the work hours of Ghanaian boys 
(Bhalotra and Heady, 2000). The same study finds that the presence of younger boys (under 
10) in the household reduces the work participation of both boys and girls aged 10-14 in rural 
Pakistan, whereas the presence of little girls in the household has no effect. Without 
controlling for the work status of the mother, it is difficult to interpret this in terms of relative 
neglect of little girls. Cigno, Rosati and Tzannatos (2000) find that having both younger 
siblings (0-6) and siblings in one’s own age group (6-12) raises the probability of working of 
school-age children in rural India. Similarly, the number of 0-6 year old siblings raises the 
probability of work relative to school-only in Peru (Patrinos and Psacharapoulos, 1997).  
Using data from Colombia and Bolivia respectively, Cartwright (1993) and 
Cartwright and Patrinos (1996) find that having older brothers and sisters reduces the 
probability that a younger child works. The presence of men and (especially) women over 60 
reduces the probability that a girl in Pakistan works, there being no effects on Pakistani boys 
or on Ghanaian children. Overall, the effects of household composition are gender-specific 
and they are stronger and exhibit a more complex pattern in Pakistan than in Ghana (Bhalotra 
and Heady, 2000). Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) who use the same Ghana data find, 
curiously, that the number of adult males in the household has a significantly positive effect 
on the work participation of 11-14 year old children in rural and urban areas, though there is 
no effect for 7-10 year-olds. They find that numbers of siblings and other compositional 
variables have no effect. Ray (2000) uses the same Pakistan data as Bhalotra-Heady and, 
aggregating over the sibling terms, finds no effects of number of siblings on child labor.  
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7.8. Female Headship 
The prevalence of female-headed households varies considerably across countries. It 
tends to be greater in sub-Saharan Africa than in Asia. For example, it is 30% in rural Ghana 
as compared with 3% in rural Pakistan (Bhalotra and Heady, 2001). Most of the studies that 
include female headship as a regressor in a model of child labor also include a measure of 
household income. If female headship significantly raises child labor participation at a given 
level of income, then it must indicate a degree of vulnerability of the household that is not 
picked up by household income. This could be its borrowing ability or, more generally, its 
ability to deal with a crisis, its perception of the range of job alternatives available to it, or its 
assessment of its human capital (i.e. a household with more adult men may be a more robust 
household, especially if they are maintained, through intra-household distributional 
preferences, in better health). The result is also consistent with women being less altruistic 
towards children than men. However the available evidence does not support this 
interpretation (see Thomas 1990, for example).  
Approximately half of the surveyed studies included this variable. There is rather 
more coherence in the results for this variable than for some of the other correlates of child 
labor discussed in this paper. Support for the hypothesis that children of female-headed 
households are more likely to work and/or less likely to be in school is found for Paraguay in 
Patrinos and Psacharapoulos (1995) and for rural (but not urban) Cote d’Ivoire in Grootaert 
(1988). Although he does allow gender-specific effects, Ilahi (1999) finds no role for female 
headship in Peru.  
Distinguishing boys and girls, Bhalotra and Heady (2000) find a positive effect of 
female headship on the hours of work of both boys and girls in rural Pakistan and, in the case 
of rural Ghana, for girls only. Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) do not separate the data by 
gender and they find that the indicator for female headship is insignificant.  
7.9. School Costs And Quality 
The opportunity cost of school attendance may be captured by the child wage rate. 
This is likely to be less affordable by poorer households, and to be more restrictive in 
environments where the school calendar is inflexible to agricultural seasons. Direct costs  
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have  also been investigated using measures of  distance to school, often indicators for 
whether there is a primary, middle and secondary school in the cluster (or community). Some 
studies also include household expenditures on education as school-level data on f ees are 
seldom available. These variables are sometimes insignificant but, when significant, they are 
often consistent with the hypothesis that improving access to school or lowering the direct 
costs of school attendance has the desirable effect of reducing child labor.
30 For example, 
Grootaert and Patrinos (1998, p.177) find a negative effect of school expenditure on the 
enrolment rate in urban Bolivia.  
There is now considerable evidence in the education literature in both developing and 
developed countries that returns to education and hence participation in education depend 
upon school quality. A comprehensive account of its importance in Ghana is presented in 
Glewwe (1996). Policy makers would benefit from looking more closely at the magnitude of 
the effects of direct costs and different aspects of quality in order to be able to prioritize 
investments in this sector. Researchers should assist in this by delineating the sizes of these 
effects in comparable terms.  
7.10. The Trade-off Between Work and School 
  Policy discussions of child labor are often motivated by its harmful effects on the 
education and health of the child. How large an effect does child labor have on education? 
Or, conversely, if increased enrolment in school is induced, what is the associated decrease in 
child labor? Most data sets describe an inverse correlation between child labor and education 
at the micro-level, which is unsurprising as these are competing uses of time. However, as 
seen in Section ?, one is not the exact inverse of the other. It is therefore possible that a 
policy intervention that results in an increase in school enrolment draws children out of 
“inactivity”, with no corresponding reduction in child labor. 
  In the time allocation problem, participation in work and school are jointly 
determined outcomes. Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) and Bhalotra (2002) estimate a 
bivariate probit model for Ghana, which allows correlation of the unobservables in the 
                                                                 
30 Direct costs of education are found to have a more direct effect on school enrolment (with little effect on 
child labor) among younger children (below the age of 12 years) in Thailand  (Tzannatos, 2003).  Labor supply 
by older children (above the age of 12 years) seems to be more affected by child wages than costs of education.   
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equations for child labor and education. They find that it is negative and significant, though 
not very large. In order to identify causal effects, we need to find an exogenous source of 
variation that uniquely affects one of these two variables. For example, Ravallion and Wodon 
(2000) treat a subsidy offered to parents that send their children to school as a source of 
exogenous variation that encourages school attendance. Their data are a large household 
survey for Bangladesh which contain information on the school subsidy offered by a local 
NGO. The subsidy has a large impact on school attendance but a much smaller impact on 
child labor, since some of those joining school were formerly inactive. Using the LSMS data 
for Ghana (Wave 2), Boozer and Suri (2001) attempt to identify the causal impact running in 
the other direction, that is, the impact of child labor on schooling. They use a novel 
identification strategy, which involves creating exogenous variation in child labor by month 
and region as a function of month-by-region rainfall. The idea is that rainfall determines the 
productivity of child labor but has no corresponding effect on the attractiveness of school 
attendance. They find that an additional hour of child labor reduces school attendance by 
about 0.38 hours. 
7.11. Child Gender 
Some studies estimate separate models for boys and girls, allowing the intercept as 
well as the slopes (i.e. the effect of every covariate) to be gender-specific (Nielsen (1998), 
Ilahi (1999), Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998), Bhalotra (2000a, 20001b, 20001c), Bhalotra 
and Heady (2000)). Most others pool data on boys and girls and allow gender-specific 
intercepts. The evidence is fairly systematic with regard to this variable. For Asian countries, 
the gender dummy tends to be significant indicating a greater participation of girls on 
account of factors that are not captured by the covariates included in the model. It is tempting 
to ascribe this to culture but it could equally be a reflection of, for example, the technology of 
home production. This is not commonly done but an interaction between age and gender is 
likely to be revealing: the participation rates of girls and boys cross at around the age of 15 in 
many developing countries.  
In the papers that estimate separate models for boys and girls, most variables show 
significant differences in their effects by gender. A lesson from this is that further analysis of 
child labor should be done by gender. Since many international and national organizations  
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influencing policy are already aware that educating girls is a specific priority expected to 
yield large social returns, it is useful for policy to have some guidance from research on what 
causes “excess labor” on the part of girls (ie that part of the higher participation or hours of 
work contributed by girls as compared with boys, that cannot be explained by the covariates 
in most standard models of child labor).  
A startling finding in this direction is that the data for rural Pakistan suggest that boys 
take wage work when their income contribution is necessary to household subsistence, 
whereas girls engage in wage work even when the household could survive without this 
(Bhalotra, 2000a). The raw data are consistent with this result: households supplying boy 
labor are on average poorer than households supplying girl labor. Another pertinent finding is 
that, in settings as diverse as those of rural Ghana and Pakistan, the probability (and 
intensity) of girls’ work on household-run farms is increasing in land size, income constant. 
In contrast, land size has no significant effect on boys’ work. These results are consistent 
with the (discounted) returns to school for boys being perceived to be larger than for girls, 
although there may be alternative explanations (see Bhalotra and Heady 2000). 
7.12. Other Child Characteristics 
Child Age: The definition of children varies across studies but they are most often 
defined as over 6 and under 15, sometimes under 18. The lower threshold is usually 
determined by data constraints: available household surveys often ask no questions of 
children under 7 in some countries (for example, Ghana) or children under 10 in others (for 
example, Pakistan). This is probably because child labor under the age of 7 is not very 
prevalent. The choice of the upper threshold is guided by UN conventions and may be 
adjusted according to culture-specific knowledge of when children start to make their own 
decisions and/or to live independently of the parental home. For some countries age 14 is the 
exit age for primary school. In many developing countries, children start school late or, 
having started, drop out or repeat grades. As a result, the age of exit can be higher and is 
quite variable. 
Most empirical studies include a linear term in age, which is either positive or 
insignificant. Where non-linearity is permitted in the specification, a quadratic effect is often  
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identified, especially for girls in Asia as they tend to withdraw from the open labor market as 
they grow into their teens.  
Relation to Household Head: Households in developing countries are large and 
complex  and often contain not just vertical but also horizontal extensions. As a result, 
nephews, nieces and sisters-in-law may be counted amongst children along with sons and 
daughters of the head of household. In sub-Saharan Africa, there is, further, a high 
prevalence of child fostering and orphans. Assuming that the head plays an important role in 
decisions regarding child labor, an interesting hypothesis is that the (biological) children of 
the household head are preferred and hence less likely to work (see Section 7.1).  
Most studies do not investigate this. Cockburn (2001) investigates this variable in 
probits for work and school in Ethiopia and finds that children of the household head are 
more likely to attend school. In contrast, Bhalotra and Heady (2000) find that children of the 
head are more likely to be in work in rural Pakistan and that, in Ghana, sons are less likely to 
be in work but there is no effect in the case of girls. These results may signal an Africa-Asia 
difference but further research into this question is merited before any conclusions can be 
drawn. Ainsworth (1996) presents an empirical analysis of child fostering in the Cote 
d’Ivoire, where more than 20% of children live away from home. Given the increasing 
proportion of orphaned children in Africa (see Subbarao et al, 2000), it is important to 
investigate whether outcomes are different for children living with adult carers other than 
their parents. In a recent publication, the World Bank (2002) describes the relation between 
orphanhood and school enrolment as ambiguous. Based on data from Uganda, Bishai et al. 
(2001) show that biological relatedness is a strong predictor of the quality of care offered to 
children. Case and Paxson (2001) show that mothers are the “gate-keepers” for their 
children’s health investments. Analysis of schooling data also suggest the importance of 
targeting orphans rather than just poor households. Evidence from the Demographic and 
Health Surveys for 10 countries in sub-Saharan Africa in which households were interviewed 
between 1992 and 2000 shows that orphaned children in Africa live, on average, in poorer 
households and are significantly less likely than other children to be enrolled in school. The 
lower school enrolment of orphans as compared with other children is not explained by their 
greater average poverty: orphans are less likely to be in school than non-orphans with whom  
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they co-reside. This suggests that distant relatives and (to a greater degree) unrelated 
caregivers invest less in orphaned children than in their own children or closer child relatives 
(Case, Paxson and Ableidinger, 2002).
31 
Completed School Years of the Child: In commonly estimated models of adult labor 
supply, the main explanatory variables are non-labor income and the wage rate on offer. The 
educational level of the adult male is typically excluded from the labor supply equation and 
used to instrument the wage. This is a debatable practice if education affects tastes for work 
(see Pencavel, 1986, for example). In the case of children, in addition to picking up tastes, 
the completed level of schooling may determine the probability of work today if parents have 
a notion of a target level of schooling (for example, that needed to attain functional literacy). 
None of the surveyed studies has  included this variable although it is considered in 
Bourguignon et al (2003) and Bhalotra (1999); see Section 6.5.  These studies do not 
instrument child labor, it being very difficult to find a valid instrument. This variable is 
clearly endogenous since completed school years will reflect past child labor decisions which 
are omitted and correlated with current child labor decisions. 
Innate Ability Of The Child: Using test score data that were collected in a special re-
survey of the Ghana LSMS, Bhalotra and Angeriz (2002) investigate the effects of ability on 
the work-school choice. Bivariate probit estimates indicate that ability increases the 
probability of school attendance and reduces the probability of child labor amongst boys but 
has no effect amongst girls. The effects of these test scores on school attendance and wages 
are explored in Glewwe (1996). There is not much other work on innate ability, no doubt 
because it is difficult to measure. Even test score data are somewhat dubious since they may 
depend upon past work-school choices. Ideally, one would like data that span a considerable 
period of time, including information on cognitive skills at a young age and labor supply 
patterns at older ages. Panel data will allow a persuasive control for individual heterogeneity 
in ability but of course, as this is a fixed effect, estimates of its effect on child labor or 
schooling will not be obtainable.  
                                                                 
31 Further discussion of orphanhood and fostering is in Bhalotra (2002).  
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7.13. Age and Occupation of Household Head 
Age of the Household Head: This is an indicator of the stage of the lifecycle that the 
household is at. If the oldest male reports as head, then this variable may also indicate 
whether the child lives in a vertically extended household, with grandparents. If the equation 
also includes a full set of age-gender variables that reflect household composition (for 
example, the proportion of males and females in across a set of age groups), then the age of 
the household head has a less clear meaning and a weaker role to play. This may explain why 
not many studies include this variable. 
Occupation of The Household Head: A few of the studies surveyed condition on this 
variable. It is likely to be especially important to distinguish between households engaged 
primarily in agricultural activity, and others. This is because children are more likely to work 
in agricultural households than in other households with the same living standards for the 
following reasons. First, the nature of farm work allows it to be combined with schooling, 
which it is in many countries, notably in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, agriculture makes 
seasonal labor demands and, in peak seasons, there may be labor shortages that result in 
families falling back on the reserve labor of children. Even when hired labor is available, 
family labor may be preferred, for example, because it is easier to supervise. Third, parents 
may see some value in training children in farm work if they expect their children to inherit 
the farm (see Section 5.4). The omission of family occupational indicators from child labor 
equations may be justified by including a measure of land ownership for rural households as 
this variable will tend to closely approximate the agricultural status of the household 
(although no authors of the surveyed studies present this argument). 
7.14. Employment and Wages of Parents  
Employment Status of Parents: We discussed in Section 6.2, the idea that parent and 
child labor supply are jointly determined. We argued that parent labor supply or else wages 
should be included as regressors in a model of child labor in addition to household income, 
unless separability has been established. If participation or hours variables pertaining to 
parents are included as regressors, they should be instrumented.   
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Some studies include a binary variable indicating whether parents  are employed, 
although they typically neglect to instrument it. This has produced some evidence relating to 
the commonly held view that (older) girls substitute mothers in their (domestic) work 
activities when mothers take work outside and there are younger children in the home 
(Levison (1991), Patrinos and Psacharapoulos (1995). So, for instance, using data from the 
Philippines, Sakellariou and Lall (1997) find that the children of working mothers are more 
likely to be engaged in work, irrespective of whether it is market work or housework, and the 
mean elasticity is 0.086. This effect is especially marked for female children. A similar result 
suggesting complementarity of adult female and child labor is reported for Columbia by 
Cartwright (1996). In their study of Bolivia, Cartwright and Patrinos (1996) find that children 
shift from full-time to part-time work when mother’s enter the labor market. This is an 
interesting illustration of the fact that results from a univariate model with choices in-work 
vs. n ot-in-work may appear to contradict results from a multinomial model in which the 
choices are defined to distinguish part-time and full-time work. In their analysis of Ghanaian 
data, Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) find that child labor is encouraged by parents being 
in self-employment. This is consistent with our earlier discussion of the incentive effects of 
ownership of productive assets (Section 5.4). Separability of parent and child labor supply is 
investigated in Bhalotra (2000b) using the LSMS for rural Pakistan. Separability cannot be 
rejected in the case of boys but, in the case of girls, it is rejected for both fathers and mothers. 
Contrary to the commonly held view, mother’s work appears to be complementary to girls’ 
work. Father’s work, on the other hand, is a substitute for girls’ work. 
Adult Wage Rates: Optimization of a standard model with a unitary utility function 
defined over all household members will yield a labor supply equation for children that 
shows that child labor depends upon the child wage as well as the wage rates of other 
household members (such a model is set out in Bhalotra (2000a), for example). This can be 
translated into a conditional model by replacing the wage rate of a family member (for 
example, parent) with the hours of work of that person- as discussed in the preceding sub-
Section. The cross wage elasticities indicate substitution or complementarity between child 
labor and the labor of other household members such as parents. This, clearly, is interesting 
information both from the point of view of policy and because it offers insights into intra- 
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household allocation. In a seminal theoretical paper on the economics of child labor by Basu 
and Van (1998), the level of the adult wage is a critical variable, used to define a subsistence 
threshold in an economy where non-labor incomes are small or can be assumed constant. 
Important information that should be carried along with these estimated cross-wage effects is 
whether they are obtained conditional on parents’ education (which is expected to be 
correlated with their wage) and whether the wages refer to market wages or to individual-
specific wages imputed based on data on earnings and hours. In the latter case, the issue of 
predicting a wage for adults (especially women) that are not in work arises and needs to be 
addressed (see Jacoby 1993). 
Ray (1998) finds that a 1% increase in the wage rate of an adult male leads to a 1% 
decrease in the probability of child work participation in Peru but that an increase in the wage 
rate of  adult females in Pakistan increases child labor there. Broadly similar results were 
found in earlier studies. Levy (1985) found that, in Egypt, a 1% increase in adult female 
wages reduced child hours of work by 2.7% for children aged 6-11 years and by 1.5% for 
children aged 12-14 years. However, adult male wages appeared to have a positive effect on 
child employment (in direct contradiction of the Basu-Van hypothesis, for example). Using 
Indian data, Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) find that adult wages reduce child labor 
amongst girls but not boys: a 1% increase in the adult male wage reduces girls’ hours of 
work by 1.2%  and a rise in the adult female wage to 10% above the mean reduces the 
employment rate of girls by 14% (cited in Sasaki (1999)). 
7.15. Community Variables:  
Several of the surveyed studies include indicators of community infrastructure. These 
include indicators for whether there is a primary, middle and secondary school, whether there 
is a road, a bus, shop, a post-office, a bank, a regular market, and the fraction of households 
that have access to safe water and electricity. Indicators of the activity levels of labor markets 
for adults and children and also of land and credit markets would be very useful though these 
are not easily found or defined (see Section 6.11). There are no very consistent results across 
studies but there are some occasional interesting results. For example, the presence of a road 
and a bus may be expected to improve access to a school, though we cannot rule out the 
possibility that it improves access to outside work for a child. Irrigation and electrification  
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may be expected to reduce local labor demand and thereby reduce child labor (we indicated 
earlier that Levy (1985) supports a beneficial effect of mechanization in  Egypt), but it is 
difficult to generalize. 
7.16. Regional Unemployment  
In order to allow for the possibility that children want to supply more labor than they 
are able to given prevailing labor demand, a sensible empirical specification should condition 
on the regional unemployment rate (Ham (1986), Card (1988)). The only study that does this 
is Bhalotra (2000a), who finds a negative effect of community-level unemployment on the 
labor supply of boys (the unemployment measure being constructed from individual 
responses). Note that this is distinct from the effects of household-level unemployment, for 
example, of a father. 
7.17. Region Effects 
It is strikingly evident that there are differences across developing countries in the 
nature and extent of child work and some of the broad parameters of the differences by 
continent were profiled in Section 3. Within countries, rural areas support a higher incidence 
of child labor than do urban areas. Why is this? Does it simply reflect a higher incidence of 
poverty in rural regions? The fact that a rural-urban dummy tends to be significant in child 
work participation equations even when household income has been held constant suggests 
that household-level poverty is not a sufficient reason. Additional reasons for a higher rural 
incidence include the following. Relatively weak school infrastructure and lower rates of 
technical change in rural areas may discourage school attendance. At the same time, children 
may be more easily absorbed into the informal economies of rural areas. This is on account 
of the prevalence of self-employment, relatively low skill requirements in agricultural work, 
and the greater degree of market imperfection in rural regions. In view of the higher 
incidence of child labor in rural areas, it is relevant to note the considerable interest that has 
been shown in geographic targeting (Baker and Grosh (1994), Ravallion and Sen (1994)): it 
makes sense for countries to initiate child labor programs in poor rural regions.  
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7.18. Shocks 
The hypothesis that child labor may be a form of household insurance has been 
recognized for a long time but it is only recently, with the availability of appropriate data, 
that it has been investigated. The effects of price changes on youth employment have been 
considered in Alessie et al (1992) and in Grootaert (1998) and the effects of income shocks 
on school attendance by Jacoby and Skoufias (1997). Recent studies that evaluate the role of 
credit constraints include Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti (2003), Edmonds (2002), Guarcello, 
Mealli and Rosati (2002) and Dehejia and Gatti (2002). 
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8. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
We remarked earlier that there was an unfriendly distance between theory and applied 
work on child labor. A similar distance seems to prevail between most applied work and 
policy-design. There are exceptions and there is bound to be some filtering through of ideas 
and findings from theoretical and applied research, but the introduction of policies and their 
design seem to have relied largely upon common-sense, awareness and media campaign, 
accumulated operational expertise, local knowledge, international concerns or direct pressure 
and political will. It is expected that, as empirical research grows and becomes both more 
pointed in its objectives and more robust in its findings, it will offer insights that policy-
makers find easier to draw upon. An important aspect of applied research is to identify 
interesting questions and then to find ways in which they can be addressed with the data or 
resources available. 
Deriving direct insights for the appropriate design of policy ideally involves three 
linked steps.  
•  First, we need theoretical models of child labor that capture relevant aspects 
of the decision-making process that results in children supplying labor and 
that are able to accommodate the “institutional” facts relating to child labor.  
                                                                 
32 These are not reviewed in any detail as they appeared after this paper was practically written. As indicated 
earlier, this survey is only a partial review, including mostly research done by or for the World Bank.  
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•  Second, we need to develop empirical procedures that are able to investigate 
the predictions of alternative theoretical hypotheses and, thereby, reject one 
model in favour of another (allowing context or region specificity).  
•  Third, we need to have in place mechanisms for the implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of the program that are sensitive to the political 
economy of the region.  
Evaluated in these terms, the design of policy in this area is currently quite rudimentary.  
A weakness of recent discussion of policy interventions targeted at child labor is that 
they have neglected to recognize the predominance of household employment amongst child 
workers (evidence of which was cited above). This has been influenced by media coverage of 
child labor in export sectors such as the carpets, garments and sports equipment industries, 
resulting in debate on the role of trade sanctions, international labor standards and minimum 
wages (see Basu (1999), Basu and Tzannatos (2003)). To the extent that the parents of child 
laborers are self-employed, an adult minimum wage will have, at best, indirect effects on 
child labor. Trade sanctions that involve banning the import of products made with child 
labor will typically have no direct effect on children who work on subsistence farms. 
Legislation that bans child labor is especially difficult to monitor when children are 
employed in household-run or home-based activities. The preoccupation with these sorts of 
legislative interventions, therefore, may be misplaced after a point. The design of policy to 
address child labor depends upon recognizing that most children work with or for their 
parents in economies where markets are underdeveloped and the legal and political 
infrastructure is thin.  
Another fact that policy has, in its detachment from large-scale representative data, 
neglected is that a fairly substantial fraction of children report being neither in work nor in 
school (“idle”)- this too was discussed above. While these children may be engaged in 
domestic chores that are not counted as work, it is by no means evident that this is the case. 
First, by common accounts, boys in Asia do not do much domestic work and, nevertheless, a 
non-negligible fraction are reported to be idle. Second, even if these children do engage in 
some domestic work it seems unlikely that this is a full-time occupation. A plausible 
explanation of the extent of “idleness” is that it is seen where opportunities for both work and  
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school-attendance are limited. In this case, general “economic development” may, by 
stimulating both opportunities, result in some tendency for both work and school attendance 
to rise. While this tendency is unlikely to dominate in data that include non-idle children, it 
may contribute to explaining why the relation of economic growth and child labor incidence 
is, in some cases, non-linear (see Bhalotra 2002b). 
Alternative policy instruments to address child labor include elements of a general 
pro-poor growth policy; (conditional) cash transfers that cover the opportunity cost of school 
attendance; credit provision; policies that encourage the development of land and labor 
markets; investments in the quality and availability of schooling; measures that reduce 
employment and labor market discrimination against women and girls; the introduction of 
more flexible school schedules and more relevant curricula; and investments in the health of 
both children and adults. More controversial alternatives include bans on child labor, 
compulsory schooling, trade sanctions and adult minimum wages. Further discussion of the 
range of policy options is in Bhalotra (2002a, 2002b); for further discussion of labor 
standards see Basu (1999). 
Considerable progress has been made in the last couple of years in designing and 
implementing policy programs that are directed at reducing the incidence of child labor. 
Possibly the most highly regarded and researched are the income transfers programs that are 
part of Progresa in Mexico, Bolsa Escola in Brazil and PACE in the Honduras (see Becker 
(1999), World Bank (2000): p. 158, and Orazem, Sedlacek and Tzannatos (2003)). They 
offer income subsidies to poor households conditional on their sending their children to 
school.  Similar but distinct are Food for Education programs such as implemented by an 
NGO in Bangladesh and analyzed in Ravallion and Wodon (1999). An approach that is more 
directed at reducing drop-out rates and raising the net return to schooling than to 
compensating households for the opportunity cost of school is that taken by Indonesia in its 
Back to School Program (see Filmer and Sayed, 1999). An account of a fuller range of 
measures of social protection relevant in the context of child labor is in Bhalotra (2001). 
Grimsrud (1999) discusses child labor policies and attempts to identify a role for 
international organizations operating in this field. Basu (1999) contains an interesting 
discussion of the role of labor standards. On a different note, Miljeteig (2000) discusses  
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actions that international organizations might take in creating partnerships with children and 
youth. He sets out the principles underlying creation of partnerships and the characteristics of 
existing organizations. 
Programs may need to be specifically tailored to particular needs. For example, the 
question of child vulnerability in Southern Africa is dominated today not so much by child 
labor but by high and growing rates of orphanhood (see Andvig (1999) and Bhalotra (2002) 
for more on child labor in Africa). The magnitude of the problem and good practice social 
protection measures to address orphanhood are discussed in Subbarao, Mattimore and 
Plangemann (2001). In addition to education and health or nutrition subsidies, that apply to 
all forms of child labor, finding ways of linking children to their relatives, arranging fostering 
and offering cash assistance to fostering families, or investing in orphanages, are 
complementary policy options specific to regions in which AIDS and war have killed 
substantial numbers of adults. Some specific tailoring of policy is also needed for the worst 
forms of child labor.
33 These include prostitution, soldiering, trafficking and employment in 
hazardous sectors. The international convention (ILO 182) on the worse forms of child labor 
is keeping alive the faith in addressing the worst forms of child labor through legislative 
action backed by international support garnered through local mobilization (media and 
community-based initiatives). 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CHILD LABOR 
Variables  Findings  Comments 
Household Characteristics     
Parent altruism  Findings typically confirm parent altruism towards 
children.  
 
However, households that consume tobacco spend less 
on children. 
Evidence usually based on incomplete  household data 
on expenditures by adults and children. 
Parent income  Remarkably small (negative) or even insignificant 
income effects on child labor (and, to a lesser degree, on 
schooling).  Income effect not very sensitive to 
controlling for parents education; more sensitive to 
whether land ownership is held constant. 
 
Experimental data produce larger income effects. 
Income effects  on child labor and schooling are usually 
larger (in absolute terms) for girls. 
Weak income effect can be explained by inappropriately 
controlled endogeneity, measurement error in income, or 
else by income reflecting land ownership in the absence 
of explicit controls for land.  
 
The resulting bias is in the direction of making the 
income effect on child labor less negative.  
 
Need more evidence associated with policy experiments 
or exogenous income shocks.  
 
Results suggest education of girls more of a luxury than 
that of boys. 
Income shocks  Negative shocks appear to increase child labor.   Policy changes such as pension reform or changes in 
trade regime create exogenous changes in income that 
can be used to study the effect of income on child labor.  
 
Research needs to pay more attention to distinguishing 
ex ante and ex post responses to shocks. For example, 
child labor may be used to diversify income sources (ex 
ante) or to compensate for unanticipated income shocks 
like a bad harvest or an adult illness (ex post)   
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ANNEX (Cont’d) 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CHILD LABOR (Cont’d) 
Variables  Findings  Comments 
Household Characteristics     
 
Child wage 
(or poverty compulsions) 
Some evidence that the child wage has a negative effect on 
child hours of work for boys, though no effect for girls. 
 
A negative effect on child hours of work is consistent with 
the child working towards a subsistence target.  
 
As predicted by economic theory, participation in work 
tends to be a positive function of the wage. 
Results lend support to concerns that trade sanctions or 
bans may increase child labor by decreasing the child 
wage, leaving households that rely upon child labor 
worse off.  
Parent education  Fairly consistent finding of negative impact of educational 
level of both mother and father upon child labor. 
 
Different effects of mothers’ and fathers’ education on 
daughters’ and sons’ labor. 
Effects of parent education at constant income or wealth 
levels may be taken to reflect better household 
information or a preference of educated parents for 
educated children.  
 
Most studies use a linear specification but the education 
effect may in fact exhibit non-linearity. 
Parent employment   Variety of results. A seeming pattern is that father’s 
employment status is negatively associated with child 
labor while mother’s employment exhibits a positive 
association. 
The employment status of parents is potentially 
endogenous.  Its significance in a model in which parent 
income is constant indicates non-separability of parent 
and child work. 
 
Most studies fail to address these two facts and this can 
bias the income coefficient.  
Parent wage rate 
 
Limited and mixed evidence. No general pattern emerges.   Evidence is limited because wage data are often 
unavailable on account of the prevalence of self-
employment in the rural areas where most working 
children and their parents live.  
 
Some studies present results for parent wages that are 
consistent with results for parent employment: Father’s 
labor appears to be a substitute and mother’s a 
complement of child labor. However, the reverse pattern 
is seen in some other studies.  
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CHILD LABOR (Cont’d) 
Variables  Findings  Comments 
Household Characteristics     
Age of head of household  Often insignificant. When significant, sign and size 
vary with specification/region. 
Unsurprising if insignificant when household composition is 
held constant in the model. Otherwise this variable may 
indicate stage of lifecycle that household is at. 
Occupation of household head  A fairly consensus result is that the children of parents 
in agricultural occupations are more likely to work. 
Interpretation sensitive to whether, for example, land owned is 
held constant. 
 
Few studies include occupation variables. 
Farm size  Often increases child labor, especially if parent 
income or education are held constant. 
The positive effect identified is consistent with imperfect 
markets for labor and land.  
 
Implication that land re-distribution can increase child labor, 
other things equal. 
 
Overwhelming majority of working children employed on 
household farms. Yet many studies neglect to include this 
variable. 
Mode of operation of land  Indicators for whether the land farmed by the 
household is owned, rented, sharecropped (etc.) are 
typically significant.  
 
At given acreage, renting or sharecropping increases 
child labor (compared to land ownership) 
Few studies include these variables. 
 
Analysis of effects should recognise that renting or 
sharecropping are likely to be choice variables endogenous to 
the child labor decision. 
Household composition (age and 
gender structure) 
Differing specifications, complex and varied results 
but a simple pattern appears to emerge:  Number of 
adults in household reduces child labor (depends on 
biological relation), number of children increases it 
(depends on birth order). 
Households in developing countries are large and complex. 
Often more than 2 adults (see below.  
Household size  Often a negative effect though considerable variation 
in sign and size of effect, depending (inter alia) on 
whether household composition is held constant (see 
row above). 
Household size (which depends upon fertility or the quantity of 
children that parents choose to have) is jointly determined with 
child labor (a measure of child quality or parental investment in 
child human capital).  Nevertheless household size is included 
in most studies to capture long-run reduced form effects.  
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CHILD LABOR (Cont’d) 
Variables  Findings  Comments 
Household Characteristics     
Female headship  Tends to increase child labor though estimated effects vary 
and are at times insignificant. 
Female headship most prevalent in Africa; rare in Asia. Its 
effect on child labor may reflect economic vulnerability that is 
not captured by income (e.g. women may be less able to 
borrow money or to find work), or else that women have 
different preferences over child welfare than men.  
Gender  Intercept (shift) effects suggest that there is a “pure” 
gender effect or that girls work more even after various 
socio-economic and regional characteristics are held 
constant. 
 
There are also significant slope effects.  
On average, girls work more than boys, at least up to age 15. 
Gap most marked in Asia.  
 
Most studies include gender intercept but do not allow gender-
specific slopes although these clearly matter for covariates 
such as age, parent education or land ownership. 
Age  Child labor intensifies with age and the effect is often 
quadratic  
Included in almost every study; Fairly consistent results across 
regions. 
Birth order  Tendency to find that first-born children are more likely to 
work.  
Not many studies include this variable. Sometimes it is 
insignificant. This may be because birth order effects are very 
likely interactive with gender and may compete with age. 
Relation of child to household 
head 
Varied results. Evidence suggests child in Africa less 
likely to work if closely related to head but no such effect 
in Asia. 
 
No evidence of effect in interaction with parent 
characteristics. 
Recent interest in biologically-motivated altruism makes this 
interesting.  Africa-Asia difference may arise because Asia has 
fewer children in the household who are unrelated to head. 
Alternatively, child farm labor is encouraged by the incentive 
to gain work experience and this effect may be more powerful 
in Asia than in Africa as a result of their different land 
arrangements and inheritance rules. 
Highest level of education 
attained by child  
Mixed and scant results.    If there were a target level of schooling, we would expect that 
children who have achieved a higher level of education would 
be more likely to move into work. If, however, there is no 
target then we would expect that the (possibly unobserved) 
factors (like ability or parent’s tastes for education) that have 
led a child to achieve a higher level of education today would 
keep him or her out of work tomorrow.  Increasing returns to 
educational level would also tend to discourage children with 
some schooling experience to leave school for work.  
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CHILD LABOR (Cont’d) 
Variables  Findings  Comments 
Household Characteristics     
Ability of child  Evidence that this increases school attendance and 
reduces child labor amongst boys while having no effect 
on the work-school choice for girls.  
Difficult to find measure of ability that is not itself a function 
of the work-school choices. Very few studies explore test 
scores. 
 
Health of child  The limited evidence available indicates a positive effect 
on child labor relative to inactivity but negative effect 
relative to school attendance. 
This results refers to the effect of the child’s innate health 
endowment on the chances(s) he will work. This may be 
difficult to disentangle from the reverse effect, that is, the 
impact that working has on child health. 
School costs and quality  Distance to school typically increases child labor. 
 
Limited and diverse evidence on effects of school costs 
and quality. Many surveys ask respondent why child 
was not sent to school. A common response is that the 
opportunity cost is too high. It is less common to find 
people say that quality is too low. 
Effects of direct interest to policy. 
 
Distance effects are conditional on transport infrastructure.  
 
Expenditure on school is a difficult variable in participation 
models, being zero by definition if child is not in school.  
 
Quality is multi-dimensional. Not many studies use it. 
Other community infrastructure  Mixed effects, depending on infrastructure type (e.g. 
electricity, transportation,  credit availability, etc). 
Not many studies use these data  Mechanisms underlying 
effects indirect, often unclear. 
Unemployment in community  Limited evidence.  .Some studies find the expected 
negative effect on child labor especially for boys.. 
Not many studies include this variable. Inclusion consistent 
with modeling labor supply when disequilibrium in market. 
Region of residence  Child labor higher in rural areas. Regional and location 
dummies indicate significant province/district effects 
even within the same broader. 
Important for geographic targeting. 
Region effects conditional on household characteristics may 
indicate economic effects (e.g.) labor demand conditions or 
non-economic ones (such as social norms). 
Notes:  
(i)  A “negative” (“positive”) effect of a variable (say, X) on child labor implies that increasing X reduces (increases) child labor.   
(ii)  In empirical studies, “adults in the household” typically replace “parents” as households in developing countries often contain more than two 
adults, usually relatives who, at least to some degree, pool resources with the nuclear family.  
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